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INTRODUCTION
HFERE are two ideas,  apparently  unrelated,  that I  want to  argue
are, from the perspective of a theory of interpretive fidelity-or
fidelity  theory-intimately connected.
First:  Judges  live life subject to constraints.  They judge subject to
constraints.  These constraints, for the most part, are the same sort of
constraints that we all face.  They are the constraints of how they, and
how we, see the world.  They are a function of the things we  take for
granted-the things we don't think much about; that we argue, subject
to; that  we  contest, relative  to.  Judges  judge  subject  to  these  con-
straints.  These constraints  change.  And judgments  (and judges)  are
vulnerable to these changes.
*  Thanks to Curtis Bradley, Rosemary  Coombe, Jack Goldsmith, Larry Kramer,
Alan Meese, Richard Posner, Arti Rai, Anthony Sebok, Peter Strauss, and Ruti Teitel
for guidance on much of this, and especially the University of Colorado at Boulder's
Legal  Theory Workshop,  the  Columbia Legal  Theory  Workshop,  the University  of
Virginia Legal Workshop Series, and NYU's Sager/Eisgruber Colloquium, for helpful
criticisms  of the Erie-effect.  I am indebted  to David  Strauss for  help on  the equal
protection  argument  in  particular.  Funding  for  this  project  was  provided  by  the
Douglas Law and Government Fund and the Sarah Scaife Foundation.  Excellent re-
search assistance  was provided by Ashley Parrish.
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Second:  Readings of the Constitution change.  This is the brute fact
of  our constitutional  past.  The  Constitution  is  read  at  one  time to
mean one thing; at another, to mean something quite different.  These
changes track no change in constitutional text; nor do they follow con-
fessions  of earlier mistake.  How, we should ask, could these changes
be consistent with a theory of interpretive fidelity?
We  have been  debating  this  question  of interpretive  fidelity  for a
very long time.'  It is late in this argument's  day.  So if there is some-
thing new to be added to this debate, one has a duty to put the new up
front.  So here  is  the new  that I want to  argue:  That any  theory  of
interpretative  fidelity  must  account  for the first  point;  and  that  ac-
counting  for the first point is  a way  to understand  the second.  That
understanding  how changed  readings  can  be readings  of fidelity  de-
pends upon understanding how the constraints  of context matter in a
theory  of interpretive fidelity.
Most theories  ignore  the first point,  and simply  hide  the  second.
Most proceed as if this stuff taken for granted can, as it were, be taken
for granted.  Others  (within the cruder forms of the  "it's all politics"
school)  presume  such constraints  are all that  there is-as if constitu-
tional law were  simply epiphenomenal  upon social and political  con-
text.  But  constraints  of context  are neither  nothing, nor everything.
They are something more interesting  than either extreme allows.  My
claim  is that we can say something useful about how  and where they
matter; and that saying something  useful about how and where  they
matter is essential  if a theory of fidelity is to be complete.
Put most crudely, my  account  will  track readings  as  a function  of
three states (as in the "states" that water may take-solid, liquid, gas)
that contexts may take. The first is the state when things are taken for
granted-when matters, in a way that I will describe more fully below,
stand relatively uncontested in the  present interpretive  context.  The
second  is when  things  stand contested-when,  again  in  a way that I
will  describe  more  fully below,  they  are  understood,  in  the present
interpretive  context  to be  the  subject  of dispute.  And  the  third  is
when things change from contested to uncontested,  or uncontested to
contested.
These states, and the constraints that they yield, will matter, I sug-
gest,  to a  range  of changed  readings in  our constitutional  past;  they
will reveal a pattern in these changed readings;  and they will suggest
something  about how we  might expect readings to change  in the  fu-
1. The best of the early vollies is in Paul Brest,  The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding,  60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980).  Compare Edwin Meese III, Ad-
dress Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist  Society Lawyers Division, reprinted  in
Interpreting  Law  and Literature:  A Hermeneutic Reader  25  (Sanford  Levinson &
Steven Mailloux  eds.,  1988)  with Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles  and Some First
Amendment Problems,  47  Ind. L.J. 1 (1971).
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ture.  In what follows, I sketch this pattern and how it will matter to a
theory of interpretive  fidelity.
The theory of fidelity that  I describe  is  an account grounded  in a
practice of translation.  Again, my broader claim is that any theory of
fidelity  must describe the  constraints I discuss here.  But a  theory of
fidelity  as  translation  makes  sense  of just  why  such  an  account  is
needed.  In the  first section below,  I describe  the theory briefly, and
incompletely, for its idea is quickly grasped (and I have described it in
tedious detail  elsewhere).  In the second section,  I  then  explore the
place that these constraints of context have in the  account of fidelity
as translation, and the place they must hold in any account of interpre-
tive fidelity.
I.  FIRST STEPS
Readings  of the Constitution  have  changed.  A theory  of  fidelity
must  explain  at  least  this.  It  must  explain,  that  is,  why  readings
change, whether such changes are changes of fidelity, and more gener-
ally, how we could know whether such changes are changes of fidelity.
A  theory  modeled  on  translation  is  one  such  account.  It  uses
"translation"  as  a heuristic for suggesting just how changed  readings
could  be  changes  of fidelity.  It  uses  this  heuristic  for  guiding  this
change to assure that they are.  The heuristic is modeled upon linguis-
tic translation,  or what we  ordinarily  mean by "translation,"  but the
pattern it invokes is much broader than that.  As  George Steiner puts
it, "[w]hen  we read or hear any language-statement from the past...
we translate."'  Translation, in this sense, is a practice to understand a
contextually  distant  text,  whether  a text written  in  a  different  lan-
guage,  or a text written  at  a  different  time.  It  is  translation  in  this
broader sense that I mean to model, and  the ethic that this  practice
invokes that I mean to draw upon.
But we must be clear about the role that a theory of translation  is to
fill.  It is not the  only player in an  account of interpretive fidelity or
history.  It is not an elixir of constitutional understanding.  I don't be-
lieve that a theory of translation explains  all changed readings in our
constitutional  past:  Some readings  change  for  reasons  unrelated  to
the understanding of translation.  Some change, for example, because
the  Constitution  has  changed-because  it  has,  for  example,  been
amended.3  Some change because  the interpreter  is trying to synthe-
2.  See  George  Steiner,  After Babel:  Aspects  of Language  and  Translation  28
(1975).
3.  Brushaber v. Union Pac. RR, 240 U.S. 1 (1916),  is a simple example.  Brusha-
ber changed the reading  of the  taxing power offered  in Pollock  v. Farmers'  Loan  &
Trust  Co.,  157  U.S. 429 (1895).  Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18-19.  It did so  because be-
tween the reading  offered  in Pollack and the reading  offered  in Brushaber,  the Six-
teenth Amendment  was ratified.  i at 20.
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size an amendment  into the unchanged  Constitution.4  Some change
because an earlier reading turns out to be a mistake.5  Or some change
because of simple politics. 6  If these are the five reasons that readings
may change, then translation is one of four justified reasons why read-
ings change.  It is an account that seeks to explain  a residual-to ex-
plain changes that amendment, or synthesis,  or mistake, don't.
This is the positive use of a theory of translation.  There is a nega-
tive  use  as well-one  which  perhaps  motivates  the  positive  theory,
and best introduces  the role that the positive  theory must play.  The
negative use is in response to what might seem an intuitively attractive
account of interpretive fidelity.  Its aim is to dislodge this initial intui-
tion.  So let me begin with this negative use, by arguing what fidelity is
not.
A.  What Fidelity Is Not
Fidelity  on any account implies a certain constancy; the question is
what sort of constancy this is.  One might think that the faithful reader
is the one who does just what the author would have done-or in our
case, that the faithful  interpreter of the  Constitution  is  the one who
does just what the  Framers would  have  done.  This  is fidelity  at the
level  of  results:  We  can  imagine  the  Framers  confronted  with  the
questions we must answer;  we can imagine what  they would  answer;
fidelity  (so understood)  demands that we give the same answers  that
they would have given.
We can  call this one-step  originalism, and distinguish two different
forms.  One  is historical:  it concerns  questions  that the Framers  did
confront-paradigm  cases, we might say, that expressed  their under-
standing  of  the  Constitution's  original  meaning.7  The  other  is
counterfactual:  it  concerns  questions  that  we  imagine  the  Framers
confronting-questions  like,  What  would  Madison  say  to  this  ques-
tion?  In either form, we are returning, in a sense, to a place or person
long gone, and putting a question there, or to them, to see what their
answer was, or would be.  That answer, this form of fidelity says, is the
answer that we  too must adopt.
It is true that no theorist of fidelity, whether judge or academic, has
ever adopted such a theory for every kind of constitutional  question.
But it is  not true that no one  is  a  one-step  originalist,  at least for a
4.  This is my view of Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See Lawrence  Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev.  395, 409-10
(1995)  [hereinafter  Lessig,  Understanding  Changed Readings].
5.  The recent reversal of the question whether Victim Impact Statements  are ad-
missible is defended  as a change grounded  in a mistake. See Payne v. Tennessee,  501
U.S.  808,  830  (1991).
6.  A better understanding  of the same case may be just politics.  See id. at 844,
850  (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
7.  See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the  Constitution as Spoken,  104  Yale  L.J.  1119,
1169-71  (1995).
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broad  range  of important  cases."  One-step  originalism  is  alive  and
well in our legal culture.  But whether general or not doesn't matter
for my purposes here.  The point of the category  is to make plain one
conceptually  possible theory  of fidelity, and then to make  plain  just
why such a conception can't be fidelity in any meaningful sense.  This
we can  see either from  a reflection  in the form  of an example, or in
the form of a theory.
The examples are many, but one should suggest the point.  The one-
step says that we look to what the Framers  would have said to deter-
mine what the  Constitution means.  So does the Constitution  include
the power to regulate  commerce in meat?  If one answered  that ques-
tion by returning  to the Framing, and putting the question to a select
few of the Framers, the answer would have been "no."  At the time of
the  Framing,  the  slaughter  business  was  local:  Meat  could  not  be
shipped any great distance  without great spoilage;  its market was re-
stricted; and because its market was restricted, a clause that gave Con-
gress  the  power to regulate  commerce  among  the several  states  did
not give Congress the power to regulate  slaughtered meat.
Early  in  the  nineteenth  century,  cold-storage  transport  was  in-
vented; by the mid-nineteenth  century,  it was the dominant mode of
transporting  slaughtered  meat.9  This  transport  carried  slaughtered
meat  far beyond  the limits  of its  local  area  of production.  Indeed,
after the establishment of cold-car transport, the market for meat be-
came quite national.  Meat was shipped in interstate commerce across
the  country,  and  the  quantity  of  meat  produced  increased
dramatically.
All this is obvious.  But the obvious should remind us about what is
within  the  practice  of  a  faithful  reading  of  the  commerce  power.
Under  any plausible  modem  reading of the  commerce  power, it in-
cludes the power to regulate the sale of this meat,10 because readings
of the commerce power depend upon something about  the world  the
commerce power functions in.  Readings must be made with reference
to that world.  But on the method of the one-step, they are not.  On
the method of the one-step, the question is answered in 1791, cold-car
transport notwithstanding.
Now again,  no  one takes this extreme  one-step  position--consist-
ently  at least  with  respect  to  commerce,  even  though  the  rhetoric
8.  While Justice Scalia's views are more subtle than this, his writing does at times
suggest one-stepism. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Oilman v. Evans,
750 F.2d  970,  1038  n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984)  (en  banc)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting);  Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989)  [hereinafter Scalia,
Originalism].
9.  See Oscar  Edward Anderson Jr., Refrigeration  in  America:  A History of a
New Technology and Its Impact 65 (1953).
10.  At least  as  to its transport across  state lines.  As  for the bucking of the  old
Court in what might be thought to be related areas,  see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251  (1918).
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among  originalists  often  suggests  something  quite  close."  But  my
point is not to defeat a movement with a single example.  It is instead
to establish  what  seems to me an  inescapable  conclusion:  that  once
one rejects  this clean, one-step originalist  view, one is launched  on a
very difficult  task:  to separate out changes in the interpretive context
that will matter to interpretive  fidelity from  changes  in the interpre-
tive context that won't.  How one does this is an extremely important
question.' 2  However one does that, my point so far is just this:  That
fidelity  must  include  something  more  than  just  asking  what  they
would have  done.
That is the example of why one-step originalism can't be a theory of
fidelity.  The  theory  follows just  about  as  neatly.  The  Framers  said
what they said in order  to say something;  what their words  said was
set in part by the context within which they said them.  Had that con-
text been  different, then, to say the same thing, they would have had
to  speak  differently.  Their  words,  their  meaning,  hung  upon  this
context.
In interpreting  their words,  then, no doubt the original context sets
an anchor.  It sets the orientation, or the direction, or the meaning, of
what they  wrote.  It determines  the measure  against  which  all  that
happens  afterwards  must be set.  It is  the baseline that should guide
later readings.
What should this guidance be?  For the one-step originalist, the gui-
dance  is the result; the result is the beginning and the end; it sets the
original and current answer.  But if meaning  hangs  on context,  then
this method creates an odd result.  For if the context within which this
original  answer  is  applied changes,  then  the meaning  of the original
answer  may change.  If we  do the  same  thing  as  they  did, then  the
meaning of what we do may be different.  And if fidelity is to preserve
meaning,  then  this means  that the  one-step  originalist's  method  is  a
method that changes the Constitution's  meaning.
For the translator, in contrast, this first moment is just a beginning.
With it  as  a  baseline,  the translator  then  constructs  a text-a read-
ing-that in the current context has the same meaning as the original
text in its original context.  Contexts change, so readings must change.
The  aim  of  the  translator  is  to  find  a  reading  that  neutralizes  the
change  in context.
11.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511,  1525  (1995)  (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
12.  Michael  Klarman  suggests  that  any  such  division  will  be  "arbitrary."  See
Michael J. Klarman, Anti-Fidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming  1997).  I  don't be-
lieve so if the division is supported by reason.  If Klarman's point is that reasons never
matter, because  reasons are  mere pretext,  then  perhaps, but so  what?  Ours  is  an
enterprise  that presupposes  the negation  of just that view.  Global  skepticism can't
touch local arguments.
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How is a difficult  question.  But the point so far is just that some-
times it must.  It must, that is, if meaning is contextual, and if meaning
is what the fidelitist must preserve.  This is the negative use of a theory
of translation.  It should get us  going on a  search  for a theory  a  bit
more thick.
B.  The Idea of Translation
A positive theory of fidelity  is such a  theory.  It uses the model  of
translation to describe just why changes in readings can be changes  of
fidelity.  Begin then with this practice (translation) that the theory  (fi-
delity as translation)  models.
In  its simplest,  perhaps  crudest  form,  the  translator's  task  is  this:
She is presented with a text that is written in one language.  This is the
source text; the language is the source language.  Her aim  is to write
another text in a second language-the  target language, and her text,
the  target  text.  If the  translation  succeeds-if it  is  a  good  transla-
tion-then  there is  an  important  relation  between  the  two  texts,  in
these two contexts:  naively put, their "meaning"  is to be "the same."
Different texts;  different contexts;  same meaning.
My claim is that judges face a similar task.  Like the linguistic trans-
lator, the judge is faced with  a text (say, the Constitution),  written  in
an original  or source context (America,  late eighteenth  century);  she
too must write a text (a decision, or an opinion) in  a different context
(America,  today);  this  decision,  in  its  context,  is  to  have  the  same
meaning as the original  text in its context.  Of course, unlike the lin-
guistic translator, the judge can't simply rewrite the original text.  That
text must remain  the  same.  But  the judge does  change  readings of
that original text:  The judge gives a reading of the original text that in
the current context yields the same meaning as the original text in its
original context.  For the legal translator, the reading  is to the original
text as, to the linguistic translator, the target text is to the source text.
This  process  is not  automatic.  But neither is  it automatic for the
linguistic  translator.  There  is  no  obvious,  or complete,  mapping  of
one  language  onto  another;  no  simple  formula  will  carry  meaning
from one to  another.  Always  the linguistic  translator,  like the legal
translator,  makes  a certain  judgment  about  how  best  to  carry  the
meaning of one world into second.  And always this judgment requires
choice.
The choices  are of two kinds.  Fist there is a choice about the kind
of fidelity  that  a  particular  type  of  translation  requires.  No  single
practice of translation governs the full range of texts that can be trans-
lated.  Bibles, instructions to children's  toys, plays,  political slogans-
while there is a practice of translation that can apply to each of these,
the  ends  of  these  practices  are  very  different.  These  differences  in
ends suggest differences in means.  Thus the first choice that a transla-
tor must make is a choice about the end that his translation is to serve.
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A second choice is  about the constraints  on the practice, whatever
the end  that has  been  selected.  And  here,  the  links with  linguistic
translation are quite rich.  For translators  struggle with a tension that
defines  the  tension  confronted  by  the judge:  If translation  requires
creativity-if there is no such thing as "mechanical"  translation-then
some  counsel the translator  to a kind of humility.' 3  Humility means
this:  to avoid translations that the translator believes make the text a
better text; to choose instead translations that will carry over a text's
flaws  as  well  as  its virtues.  This  counsel  to humility is  offered  as  a
virtue in the  translator's practice.  It is an integrity-to  be faithful to
the strengths of a text as well as the vice; to exercise the power of the
translator in a sense not to change the text translated, while in a sense
changing  the  text  translated  fundamentally.'4  On  this  view  of  the
translator's  task, fidelity  requires  a certain restraint-the restraint  to
minimize the voice of the translator in the text being  translated.
This is  the integrity  of the linguistic translator' 5 -an  integrity  that
guides  and  constrains  the  translator  in  the  practice  of  translation.
Both dimensions  of this integrity-setting  the end  of the translation,
and practicing  humility within that end-link the  practice  of the lin-
guistic translator with the practice of the judge.  For the judge as well
must select the kind of fidelity that her reading will preserve,  and she
must  pursue  that  fidelity  constrained  by  an  analogous  form  of
humility.
16
But  a nagging  difference  remains.  The  translator moves  between
two texts written in two languages; the judge moves between two texts
written in one.  The constitutional interpreter is reading a text in Eng-
lish that was written as a text in English.  What gain could there be in
modeling a process  of reading a text in the same language  on a prac-
tice of reading  a text from a different language?
The gain  in part is  the gain from being  able to draw on a body  of
related interpretive theory, to guide analogous  problems in these two
interpretive practices.  But in the main, the gain is a certain discipline,
or analytic clarity, that comes  from separating out two steps where  a
less  careful method  might see just one.
The  two steps  are  these:17  The  first  is  to locate  a  meaning  in  an
original context; the second is to ask how that meaning is to be carried
13.  This,  for  example, was  Samuel Johnson's  view.  See Bayard  Quincy  Morgan,
Bibliography:  46 B.C.-1958,  in On Translation 275  (Reuben  A. Brower ed.,  1966).
14.  See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in  Translation,  71 Tex. L. Rev.  1165,  1189-1211
(1993)  [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity  in Translation]  for a discussion of the parallels be-
tween translation  and legal interpretation.
15.  Not to  say  all do  this.  See Morgan, supra note  13,  at 277  ("[T]he  live  Dog
better than the dead Lion.").
16.  See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,  supra note 14, at 1206-11.
17.  By distinct, I do not mean that the translator does not alternate between the
two steps.  The claim is not that one step is complete before the other is taken.  The
[Vol. 65 1372FIDELITY AS TRANSLATION
to a current context.  One asks something about then  and  there; the
other asks about what is possible now and here.
The first step is difficult enough.'8  To locate meaning in an original
context, one must reconstruct, in a sense,  that original  context.  One
must reconstruct it imaginatively,  to see just how the  word read  fits
there, and  to see just how it functions.  One must  avoid reading the
word, or text, as if it were a word, or text, written here.  For though its
meaning then may be the same as its meaning now,19 often it will not,
and it is this difference  that one is searching.
To avoid this meaning-homilism requires a certain discipline, a need
that is greatest when "translating"  between two texts of the same lan-
guage.  But  even  between  two  different  languages,  the  problem  of
meaning-homilism exists.  For once again, one must take care that the
meaning of the translated text be meaning derived first from the writ-
ing context, and not the meaning  of the reading  context.
A story might better make  the point.  Jurists  from Russia  are told
that  constitutional  democracy  requires  a  "judiciary"-"judges"  and
"courts"  and a system of "laws"  enforced  by these courts.  A Russian
might wonder just  what that  could mean,  since Russia,  even  Soviet
Russia,  has always had "courts"  and  "judges"  and  "laws."  But while
Russians have  always had "courts,"  for example,  what a  "court"  is is
quite  different within  the  two  different  regimes.  A translator  must
show  the  reader  the  difference.  She  must,  that  is,  put  the  word
"court" in its context, and show its difference there from its meaning
here.
How, again, is a difficult question.  One Russian judge explained to
me how she came to see the difference.  For twenty-five years she had
been a judge in the Soviet system; after twenty-five years, she thought
she understood well  what a  "court"  and  "judge"  and  "legal  system"
were.  But after she had spent just one month observing a federal dis-
trict  court  in  Minnesota,  she  "saw"  the  differences  in  these  three
words.  When she saw the respect, and power, and apparent indepen-
dence of a federal district court judge, she understood  what it meant
to say that Russia needed  "courts"  and  "judges."  How  those  words
functioned  in these two different regimes  differed dramatically.
A translator is one who understands these differences, and who uses
them to construct a text in the reading context that helps the readers
see them as well.  She writes a text, that is, that reveals in the reading
claim instead is about the logic of the practice-that one moves in two different  ways
in completing the interpretive  task.
18.  See Scalia, Originalism,  supra note 8, at 856-65.
19.  Professor Dworkin gave the example  of the best translation of the 35 year old
requirements  is that it is  a stipulation  of chronological  age, not  emotional  age, see
Ronald  Dworkin,  The Arduous  Virtue of Fidelity:  Origialism, Scalia,  Tribe,  and
Nerve, 65 Fordhaam L. Rev. 1249,  1252 (1997), which is, I presume, just how we would
read it today.
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context the differences  that word-homilism hides.  And she does this,
whether the differences are the product of a text coming from a differ-
ent language  and culture  (Russia),  or  the product  of a text  coming
from a different culture  only (eighteenth century America).
For this is the insight of the translator:  That there is no difference in
principle between reading a text in  a different language-foreign  be-
cause  of a  distance  in culture-and  reading  a  text  from  a  different
time-foreign because  of a distance in time.  We are foreigners vis-A-
vis  Russia,  just  as  we  are  foreigners  vis-A-vis  eighteenth  century
America.20  The aim with both is to find a way to overcome this for-
eignness; to understand  despite these distances.
To overcome this foreignness requires  alienating the text read from
the current context.  The first  step  is to understand  the words  in  an
original  context.  Modeling the  practice  on linguistic  translation  re-
minds  one of the difference  that context  can make.  One is directed,
that  is,  to keep  these  terms in  their  place,  and  to understand  their
place  as  a way of understanding the terms.
That is the problem of context, the first moment of translation.  But
a second moment is important  as well.  This is the question  of how
that original meaning gets carried into the current context.  And here
it is important to distinguish between different kinds of translation.
Remember  I suggested  above that translation requires  a choice  of
ends-a decision about what the translation is to do.  This choice dif-
fers widely  across the range of texts translated, but we can  consider
two important kinds.  With one, the end is to carry a reader to a differ-
ent  interpretive  context-to  help  him  to  understand  that  different
place.  With the other, the end is to carry the message of that different
context to the reading context-to help it guide in this present inter-
pretive context.  The  first  is  about  understanding  then or there;  the
second is about guiding now and here.
Consider  two such texts to make  the difference plain-(a) the in-
structions  on  a  child's  toy,  written  originally in  Japanese,  and  (b)  a
play about the Bolshevik  revolution, written  originally in Russian.
In both  cases, the first step  of translation  is  to locate  the  original
meaning in an original context.  In case (a), we could imagine that lots
in the original text reflects lots about the original context.  One might
note, for example,  the "register"  in which the  text originally  speaks,
denoting something about the status of the intended audience relative
to the author.  Perhaps the text makes reference to particular cultural
features  of  Japan,  or  to  common  icons  in  the  Japanese  society.  A
complete execution of this first step of translation would identify these
features, so  as to understand the text.
20.  Compare  the argument of Derek Parfit, who argues that we  are closer to our
contemporaries than to our earlier selves.  See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 199-
347  (1984).  The argument  here might be considered an analog to that argument.
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But in all likelihood, it would do no more with them.  If the aim of
this translation of the instructions  to a child's toy is simply to instruct
about how to assemble,  or use, that  toy, then  these features  of this
original context will not matter much in the translation.  Indeed, these
features  would most likely  simply get in  the  way.  A  perfectly  ade-
quate translation would, in this case, strip away all this from the origi-
nal context, and simply restate the most basic features of the original
text.  For this text, the carrying over that is required is a carrying over
of the meaning of the instructions, into  a different context.  The gui-
dance  that is  needed is in the reading context.
The aim of the translation might be very different in case (b).  Here
again we imagine that the translator works first to identify the mean-
ing of the text in its original context.  Once again, there are many as-
pects of this meaning that could be noted:  whether communist leaders
spoke in a formal  or familiar grammar; the significance  of references
to Russian  events,  etc.  All  of these  features  must  be noted by  the
translator  if the translator  is to understand the original text.
But unlike case (a), here we could imagine that a good translation
would  do  something  more  than  simply note  these  original  features.
Here we could  imagine that a good translation would  then preserve
them.  For here  we could well  imagine that the  translation has as its
aim not so much the carrying of the Revolution to us, as  the carrying
of us back to the Revolution.  Like any good literature, the aim is  to
make it possible for us to get into the world being described; its objec-
tive is  to make understandable  a foreign world, by emphasizing,  and
explaining, its foreignness.  Translation with case (a), then, is carrying
the text in (a) to us, while translation in case (b)  is carrying us to the
text in (b).
Now  I  don't  mean  to  suggest  that  it  couldn't  be  the  other  way
around-that  case (a) couldn't be translated in  the manner that case
(b) is; or that case (b) couldn't be translated in the manner of case (a).
Anthropologists  might be more interested  in case (a)  translated  in a
way to help the reader understand  the Japanese  culture;  communists
might be more interested  in  case (b)  being  translated  in a  way  that
would carry forward the passion  of the Revolution.  My point is  not,
therefore, that texts carry with them their proper form of translation.
My aim instead is simply to suggest differences  in these two methods.
One  carries  a  text  to  us;  the  other  carries  us  to  the  text.  Which
method is the proper method depends upon the conception of fidelity
at stake.
For the sake of clarity, we might distinguish between these two ex-
ecutions  of the second step of translation  by calling the first  (in case
(a)) forward translation, and the  second,  backward translation.  For-
ward translation carries meaning into this context;  backward transla-
tion lets us travel back to the meaning in an original context.  Nothing
in the nature of the text itself compels the translator to pick one kind
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of translation over the other; what compels such a choice is the func-
tion, or purpose, the translation  is  to serve.  As an empirical  matter,
one might say that normative texts  are generally forward-translated,
while non-normative  texts  are not.  But whether  or not that general-
ization holds, the more general  claim is simply this:  That what  com-
pels such  a choice  is the aim of fidelity in this particular interpretive
context,  or for this particular  interpretive institution.
My  claim  about fidelity  in  our constitutional  tradition  is  that  we
have been forward translators.  Our aim has, for the most part, been
to  extract normative  significance  from  an ancient constitutional  text
and  preserve  that  significance  as much  as  possible.  What  the  con-
straints on this "as much as possible" are is something I describe in the
second part  of this  essay below.  But  the important point here  is  to
distinguish this kind of fidelity from a very different kind of fidelity-
fidelity as,  again, backward  translation.
My claim  is that in constitutional  law we have not been  backward
translators,  though some  of the very best in  historical writing  about
American  constitutional  law speaks  as  if we were.2  My  aim in  the
balance  of this essay is to give a positive account of the alternative-
forward  translation.  A complete account-one  that justifies  forward
rather than backward  translation-would require a normative  as well
as  a positive account.  But my aim here is fit, not justification.  It is to
describe  a practice that  describes what our tradition has been.
C.  How Much  Translation  Explains
So  much for  theory and for pedigree:  The test of translation as  a
practice of interpretation in constitutional theory hangs upon the re-
sults-upon how well  it fits, and justifies, the history  of our constitu-
tional practice;  and upon how well it helps us understand how best to
go on.  In this section, I sketch some examples of translation applied.
My  aim is  to suggest  its potential.  I move from the least creative,  to
the  more;  from  what  we might  think  of  as  obvious,  to  what  is less
obvious.
1.  TVs and Airforces
The Constitution doesn't speak much about televisions or airforces.
The  First  Amendment  speaks  of  the freedom  of  the  "press"; 22 and
Article  I  speaks  of  the  "army"  and  "navy."23  How  should  these
words-"press,"  "army,"  "navy"-be read  today?
The originalist might puzzle the question.  Since his method is single
step, he might survey the doctrine, and the text, and say, with a bit of
21.  For example,  Jack  Rakove,  Original  Meanings:  Ideas  in  the  Making  of the
Constitution  (1996).
22.  U.S. Const. amend. I.
23.  U.S.  Const. art. I.
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impatience, something  like  this:  "The  text  of the  First Amendment
makes  no  distinction between print, broadcast, and cable media, but
we have  done so."'
The translator, however,  can well  understand  this apparent  anom-
aly. For her method takes two steps.  First, she notes this:  At the time
all three ("press,"  "army,"  and "navy") were written, all three marked
out the full range  of each kind.  There were no  televisions, but  like-
wise, there was no device  of publication  in 1791  that was not within
the  reach  of  "the  press."  There  was  no  airforce,  but  "army"  and
"navy"  marked  out the  full range  of  the  armed forces.  Both  terms
when written were  exhaustive  of the category  that they described.
The second step is to carry these exhaustive  terms into the present.
No reason presents itself for not including televisions or airforces into
the  terms  of  the  original  grant.  The  translator,  therefore,  includes
them.  The "text"  now is about an army, navy and airforce,  or about
the press and the broadcasting media.  The Framers gave every reason
to believe  such terms  would be included;  they  could  not at the  time
exclude them; therefore, they should  be included.25
Everyone agrees with these conclusions,26 so it is useful  to remark
how sharply they diverge from what a plain language jurist might say.
They force the plain language jurist to account for the significance  of
time.  These words were "plain,"  but the change in circumstance justi-
fies our looking beyond them  to understand their meaning now.
It is useful as well to mark some limits:  It is because the category of
TVs and Airforces did not exist that it is an easy case to include them.
If our Constitution were drafted today with the very same words, the
interpretive question would be quite different and difficult.  To make
it easy,  two steps to reading must be taken.
2.  Commerce  I
A second easy  case  is a bit less easy.  The Framers  gave Congress
the power "To  regulate  Commerce  ...  among the several  States. ' 27
They also gave Congress the power "To make all Laws... necessary
and proper"  to the regulation  of "commerce  ...  among  the several
States."'   The extent of both powers turns upon something important
in  the  world-viz., the  extent  of "commerce"  "among"  the  several
states.  To the extent that there is more interstate commerce, there is a
24.  Denver Area Educ.  Telecomm.  Consortium v. FCC, 116  S. Ct.  2374, 2419-20
(1996)  (Thomas, J., concurring  in part, dissenting  in part).
25.  This, of course, leaves open the way  they were to be included-whether pro-
tected to the same  degree or differently.
26.  Though  as we see below, in  a directly  analogous question, Chief Justice  Taft
adopted quite a different understanding-finding that the Fourth Amendment did not
reach wiretapping, even though when  written, there was, of course,  no wiretapping.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277  U.S. 438, 465-69 (1928).
27.  U.S.  Const. art. I,  § 8.
28. IM
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greater  reach  to  Congress's power.  To  the  extent that  there  is  less,
there is less.  In either case, the power is contingent upon some fact in
the world.
This understanding  of the nature of the clause is original-meaning
from the origin, at least if Marshall is original.  It is the understanding
sketched in Gibbons v. Ogden29 and McCulloch v. Maryland; 3 0  and it
is  the practice of the early cases.  From the start, it was the interplay
between commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clause that defined
the scope of Congress's power to regulate commerce.  As the extent of
that commerce  expanded, so too did the power.
Of  course,  how  one measures  the  extent  of  commerce;  how  one
knows what is interstate versus intrastate; how one relates these  eco-
nomic notions to constitutional ideals-all these are tough questions,
poorly  answered  over  the past  two centuries.  But  the  point is that
however they are  answered, the relationship between  economics  and
power stands.  The Framers were realists in this sense about the Nec-
essary  and Proper  Clause  at least,  ceding to  Congress  the judgment
about whether a measure was  really necessary  and proper.  And de-
spite some honorable  and understandable  formalism in the late mid-
dle  republic  (about that, more later),  we can't help but  be the  same
sort of realists today.  We can't help but conclude (as a partial solution
at least)  that the scope and reach of the commerce power expands  as
the economy it tracks  expands.
3.  Privacy
Before there were televisions and airforces, there were also no tele-
phones, and therefore, no wiretaps.  One lived one's life face  to face;
what one wrote-in  letters  or diaries-and  kept a hold  of, was pro-
tected.  One  was protected  because  all this was  one's  property;  and
one's property-person, home,  papers and effects-could  not unrea-
sonably be searched.
When telephones  and wiretaps came around, this formula for  pro-
tection got challenged."  For one could tap my telephone without vio-
lating  my property rights.  Thus  the  question:  Was  such  a  violation
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment?
In its first consideration of the question, the Supreme Court said no.
Said  the  Court,  the Fourth  Amendment  protected  against  trespass;
29.  22 U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  1 (1824).
30.  17 U.S.  (4 Wheat.)  316  (1819).
31.  This account itself, one might well  argue, is  anachronistic.  As the  case  I  am
about to describe  came to the Supreme Court, it was not at  all plain that the amend-
ment was just about property.  The best example that it was not is Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S.  727 (1877),  where  the question was whether the Fourth  Amendment prohib-
ited the post office from inspecting  the contents of a mailed letter.  No claim of prop-
erty could establish this protection-the post office didn't want to seize the letter, just
the information contained in it. See id. at 733-37.
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wiretapping was not a trespass; so the Fourth Amendment didn't pro-
tect against wiretapping.  This was, for the Chief Justice, an easy case;
and with that opinion, life on the wire became  life in public. 2
This is classic one-step  originalism.33  But matched with  that classic
is  a  paradigm  of  two-step  translation-the  dissent  of  Justice  Bran-
deis.34  Said Brandeis, the Fourth Amendment  was meant  to protect
the privacy of people, not the sanctity of property.  To that end, given
the technologies  of the late eighteenth century, it selected the means it
did.  But as the technologies  of invasion have changed, Brandeis said,
so  too  should  the  techniques  of  protection  change.  The  Fourth
Amendment  (we  might  paraphrase,  or better,  translate)  had  to  be
translated to give  citizens in the twentieth century the sort of protec-
tion that the Framers gave  citizens  in the Eighteenth.
The Court eventually followed the intuition of Brandeis's  dissent.35
In Katz v. United States,36 it held that the Constitution protected "peo-
ple, not places. '37  And while one could well  question  the technique
used by Katz in  this effort at translation,38 one can't mistake its mo-
tive.  Its  aim was  a  certain  equivalence,  forged  between  worlds  that
had become quite distinct.
4.  Federalism, Herein  Commerce  II
I  said above that it was  an  easy  case  that the  power of  Congress
under  the  Commerce  Clause  (tied  to  the  Necessary  and  Proper
Clause)  would increase  over time,  tracking, as  the  clause suggests  it
should, an increasingly integrated  national economy.  Taken in  isola-
tion, that is true.  But the power  clauses  don't stand  in isolation.  In
context, they have  an effect upon a second aspect of the framing de-
sign-federalism.  As the scope of federal authority is enriched,  by an
expanding commerce  power,  the reach of exclusive state authority  is
impoverished.  Granting  the growth of federal  power means yielding
to the withering of the power of the state.
32.  Not that the oddness  of the result was  unremarked  upon at the time.  Many,
including  the telephone  companies,  the Justice  Department, and  many  in  Congress,
immediately questioned the opinion.  Telephone companies said they would not coop-
erate with government wire taps; the Justice Department announced it would only use
this power in extreme cases;  and members  of Congress  moved  quickly to introduce
legislation to restrain federal use of wire taps. See James Boyd White, Justice as Trans-
lation:  An Essay in Cultural  and Legal Criticism  141-59  (1990).
33.  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
34.  Holmes wrote a separate dissent. See id. at 471  (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35.  Olmstead strikes people as an easy case-easy, that is, for the dissent.  It is an
easy case  for the translator,  no  doubt.  But what it is  not  is  a paradigm  of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.  For the Court has not followed Brandeis'  methodology; it
has not continued to extend Fourth Amendment protections  to new technologies. See
Lawrence  Lessig,  Reading the Constitution in  Cyberspace, 45  Emory  L.J. 869,  906
n.105  (1996)  [hereinafter  Lessig,  Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace].
36.  389 U.S.  347  (1967).
37.  Id. at 351.
38.  I do in Lessig,  Reading the Constitution  in Cyberspace, supra note  35.
1997] 1379FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This conflict  raises a  second question  of translation.  For the  ques-
tion now is how best to read the commerce power, to preserve some-
thing  of  the  original  balance  in  the  federal  design.  Of  course  one
might argue that there is no conflict at all; one might say, that is, that
this  growth  of federal power  was  originally intended.  Perhaps.  But
assume  for the moment it was not.  The question for the translator is
how  to accommodate  this  conflict.
The history of the Commerce Clause (both negative and positive39)
tells  a nice story  of this conflict.  At first  federal  power grows  quite
extensively-a function of the easy translation I sketched above.  But
in a second stage, the Court engages in a bold, if abortive effort to cut
back.  This was the "Old Court," in the struggle that ended in 1935.  In
a series  (though  not many)  of cases, it imposed  artificial and formal
limitations on the scope of Congress's power in the name of Constitu-
tional federalism.  These limitations were said to flow from the consti-
tution  itself;  they  were  driven  by  the  observation  that  the  Framers
gave  us a Constitution of enumerated powers, yet now power seemed
unlimited.  But however true this motive may have been, the Framers
didn't give us the kinds of tools that the Old Court used to cabin fed-
eral power.  These tools that Court made up, at least in the sense that
they are nowhere found in the Framers'  text.
This is not to criticize, for I am a big fan of makings-up in the name
of fidelity.  But  it is  to emphasize  what  we have  been led to forget:
That  while  the  ends  of this  Court may  have  been  conservative,  its
means  certainly  were  not.  In  its  effort  to  impose  limits  on  federal
power, in the name of preserving something of the Framing balance, it
put firm  and wholly constructed limits  on Congress's  power;40 it  dis-
sembled  about  the  original  and  historical  understandings  of  that
power; and it pretended to find firmness and clarity in a practice  that
was anything but.  But it did this to restore-to reclaim a balance that
time had shifted.
39.  I link these two halves of the commerce question in Lawrence Lessig, Translat-
ing Federalism: United  States v. Lopez,  1995  Sup.  Ct. Rev.  125  [hereinafter  Lessig,
Translating  Federalism].
40.  These are techniques the translator must admire.  The boldest is the practice of
forgetting-for example, the forgetting of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Obvious
to any realist, the real problem with the enumerated powers is the flexibility given  by
the reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause given us by Marshall.  So understood,
Congress would have the power (by the late nineteenth century at least) of regulating
just about anything.  But the problem is that there is no other obvious way to read the
clause that would do any better.  So what the Court did, during  its short run at con-
straining Congress, was forget it.  Dropped from the federal power calculus was con-
sideration of the clause at all. See id. at 185-94.
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5.  Takings
A final  example  will complete  the  sketch.  Of all the  examples  so
far, this is the richest, and clearest, and best.  It is also not my own.'"  I
borrow it here to fill out an account of a practice of translation, in one
sense perhaps the  best that practice  could be.
The  example  is  the  Fifth  Amendment's  Takings  Clause.  At  the
founding,  this much  is  clear:  That  this clause,  neither  demanded  by
the  states, nor  common  in  state  constitutions,  protected  against  the
taking of property only.  It did not protect against regulation that had
the effect of reducing a property's value.  The Framers were not idiots;
they understood that the value of property may be reduced just as its
title may be  taken;  they had plenty  of regulations  that reduced  the
value of property, just as they had a history that included many exam-
ples  of regulation  that took  the  title to  property.  But  though  both
kinds of interference with the rights or interests of individuals existed,
they chose, constitutionally, to protect just one.  They chose, through
the  Takings  Clause,  to  restrict  the  government  only  in  the  context
where  the government takes property.
For the one-step  originalist, this should create a fairly simple prob-
lem.  As the Court consistently did through 1922, the one-step should
insist that the reach of the clause extends no further than the taking of
title.42  Regulations  are, under this view,  untouched.  For the consis-
tent one-step  originalist, regulations  should  be without  the scope  of
the clause.
But there is  something fairly  unsatisfactory  about  this  response-
enough so to move  Holmes, for example, in  1922, to push  the clause
far beyond  its original reach.  In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.  Mahon, 43
the  Court for the first time recognized  a right against  the state when
state  regulations  unreasonably  affect  the  value  of  an  individual's
property.
A number of arguments might support this conclusion:  The first is
Holmes's.  For Holmes, property was value.  If property is value, then
the clause should protect value, not just property; so when the govern-
ment acts to destroy value,  it should  compensate  those whose  value
has been destroyed.  It makes no sense to have a regime that requires
100%  compensation  for  taking  5%  of  someone's  property,  but  0%
compensation for reducing the value of someone's property  by 95%.
There are other arguments  as well.  One turns on the expansion  of
the government's power  to regulate:  It is true that at the time of the
Framing,  governments  regulated  the  value  of property  just  as  they
41.  I draw the example  from William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding  of
the Takings Clause and the Political  Process, 95 Colum.  L. Rev. 782 (1995).
42.  Compare California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.  621, 624-25 (1991)  (stating that the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment's  "seize"  is determined  by the common law un-
derstanding of "seize").
43.  260 U.S. 393  (1922).
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took it.  Thus it is true that the Framers were well aware of the impair-
ment of value that property suffered  at the hands  of regulation.  But
nonetheless, the significance of this power that government has always
had  is  different.  By  the  late  nineteenth  century,  the  economy  had
changed  dramatically; integration of the economy made more feasible
economic regulation.  This increase  in feasibility increased  the extent
of economic regulation.  And this increase in the  extent of economic
regulation  demands  a  comparable  increase  in the  protection  of  the
Takings  Clause.
A third argument  is slightly different:  The original understanding,
this  argument  acknowledges,  understood  that the  value  of property
might by reduced by regulation.  But this regulation had to be "legiti-
mate."  Legitimate regulation  was regulation designed  to stop a  "nui-
sance."  A  nuisance  was  a  use  of the  property  that was  harmful  to
others.  In a  world where  the category  of nuisance  is well cabined-
where the examples of nuisance are quite small-this exception to the
protection of property  is quite few.  But when the "nuisance"  ground
for regulation  is relaxed-when  the very concept becomes  so expan-
sive  as  to exclude  nothing-then  this  exception to  the protection  of
property begins  to swallow the rule.
While  all three arguments  are similar in effect, it is  the second two
that trigger arguments from translation.  The first does not turn upon
something that has  changed  to make it necessary  in  1922, any more
than  1791,  to see property  as just value.  Not that such an argument
couldn't  be constructed-maybe  the  nature  of our understanding  of
"property"  had  changed,  justifying,  the  argument  would  be,  the
changing  scope of the Takings Clause."  But change is not the predi-
cate to Holmes's argument, yet it is  at the  core of the latter two.
But the problem with the latter two is,  as William  Treanor  has re-
cently argued,45 that both fail to account for an important limitation in
the original clause.  The original clause, in a context where  the effects
of regulation were well understood, chose  not to protect all property
from  governmental  regulation.  It chose  instead  to protect  against  a
subset of those threats to property protection.  If we are to carry over
this  original choice, we  must make sense  of these limits.
Treanor's  argument  does  just  that.  In  making  an  argument  of
"translation,"46 he first aims to understand the principle that explains
the  limit the Framers  imposed  on  the protection  of property.  That
limit, Treanor argues, is grounded in an understanding  of the failures
of the political  process.47  The Framers aimed constitutionally to pro-
tect property  in just those  contexts where  they believed the  political
44.  See Laurence  H. Tribe & Michael  C. Dorf, On  Reading the  Constitution 70
(1991).
45.  See Treanor, supra note 41,  at 782.
46.  See id. at 856-59.
47.  See id. at 859-60.
1382 [Vol. 65FIDELITY AS  TRANSLATION
process would not.  In  his understanding  of the limit, the aim was to
correct the political  process in exceptional  cases, not to override  the
political process generally.  The question is then to identify the princi-
ple that identifies the exceptional  case.
Treanor's  second step  is then to locate, in  the current context,  the
rule that might best continue that original aim.  This, he argues, would
be a rule that identifies cases where we might expect the political pro-
cess  to fail, and then extends the protection of the Takings Clause to
those  cases  alone.8  This  rule would be  both more, and  less protec-
tive, than the current  rule.  It would protect against  some regulation
that would not be touched under the current rule and permit regula-
tion that now would be forbidden.  But the line it would  draw would
resonate with the principles animating the  original clause,  with a  re-
sulting regime closer to the Framers'  ideals than  the current.
Treanor's  argument  is  elegant  and  compelling.  It marks  well  the
space  between,  on  the  one  hand,  one-step  originalism,  and  on  the
other, an unlimited  development of a partial constitutional  principle.
A translation  of the Fifth Amendment  is between  the  extremism  of
Epstein,49 who  in effect  recognizes  no  limit in  the takings  principle,
and  the zero-ism  of  the  one-step,  which  recognizes  no trouble  with
limiting the clause to its original bounds.  Treanor's  argument lies be-
tween these two extremes and is linked with a principle  implicit in the
Framing  design.  His  aim  is  to "translate" 50-better,  forward  trans-
late-these principles into this interpretive  context.
That's the praise.  Here's the question:  There is a tone to Treanor's
argument that I want to note, for it raises a question  that will be  the
focus of the second part of this essay.  The tone is direct.  In selecting
the theory, or the hybrid of theory, that best translates  the Framers'
clause, he openly works out  a conflict  among  possible  public choice
theories to find the one that fits best. The conflict is in the open, and
his  ultimate  choice,  however  compelling,  remains  a  choice  among
these  contested  accounts.  And  in  the  end,  however  convincing  the
hybrid  seems,  one  is  still left  with  a  feeling  that there  is  something
very odd about the exercise just performed.  Or at least, there is some-
thing  odd  in  imagining  it  as  an  exercise  performed  by  a  court.
Treanor's answer may well be correct, but (odd as this may sound), he
seems too honest in the process of getting it.  One wants to say consti-
tutional law can't turn upon contested theories of public choice.  Or if
it does,  one doesn't want to have to think that it does.
48.  In addition  to this public choice interest, Treanor also  identifies an educative
function that the clause is to serve. See id. at 878-80.  I don't consider that aspect of his
argument here.
49.  Richard A. Epstein, Takings:  Private Property and the Power of Eminent Do-
main  (1985).
50.  Again,  these are  his words.  See Treanor, supra note 41,  at 856-57.
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Treanor is a  historian first.  Of course he's also a  lawyer and  was a
law clerk, but his  excellence  is  his sense  of the past and  the relation
between  that  past  and  the  present.  What's  missing,  however,  is  a
sense of the limits  of the present-or better, a sense  of the limits  of
the interpretive  context into which this rule must be carried.  This re-
quires not so much the skill of a historian, but the sensitivity of a law
clerk-the timid  hesitation  of one trying  to say  what  is  right in the
least  disruptive  way.  Treanor  may  well  have  identified  the  correct
rule, but he has not reckoned  the costs in saying it.
As  a criticism  of a  law review  article, this is  of course  unfair, and
again,  there  is  little in  this  article that  I would  quibble  with.  But  I
want to use the point to introduce the focus  on a second part of the
translator's task-the part that figures  out how to say what the trans-
lator discovers is right, on how to carry forward the commands of the
past.
This "figuring  out how to say"  is a response to a second demand on
a  practice  of fidelity.  A theory  of fidelity  must understand  how the
truth that it discovers gets integrated into the practice that it regulates.
Speaking  truth  is  rarely  costless;  and  an  institution  charged  with
speaking the truth must budget the truth that it can speak.  One com-
mitted to the translator's task will have a choice to make.  That choice
is involved doesn't make the case special:  law is always about choos-
ing among  outcomes.  But the choice here is  special.  For in choosing
among competing public choice theories, there is little outside of the
Court  that  seems  to  direct  the  choice  in  one  way  or  another.  The
choice is  among competing  theories;  among theories reasonable  peo-
ple can  disagree  about.  And  while the  Court, like other reasonable
people, can choose which among these it likes best, there is no way in
making that choice for the Court, credibly, to suggest that its choice is
not driven by its view of the best policy.  To choose  among these theo-
ries when no theory is clearly dominant is to suggest that the choice is
really about policy.
My argument is that for the Court to display  this political choice is
costly.  It is  institutionally costly  for the  Court because  (1) it makes
the Court seem less like what we consider to be a Court (executing the
commands  of others)  and more like  a  policy maker  (choosing what
policy to make), and (2) the social meaning of this subjectivity is nega-
tive for a court within our political tradition.  All things being equal, a
rule that reveals a political choice is a worse rule than a rule that does
not.  There is  a pressure  to select rules that don't reveal this political
choice.
D.  The Constraints  on Forward Translation
I have tried, in these five examples, to give a quick taste of the ca-
pacity that an account of fidelity as translation might offer.  The exam-
ples suggest its range.  If we were to extend the argument generally,  I
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suggest that both in the contexts of powers cases and rights cases, the
activism in our Court's history would  track this account  of fidelity in
translation.  Put differently:  in the litter of changed  readings that  is
our constitutional past,  among those that are not explained  either by
amendment,  or  synthesis,  a  large  proportion  is  explained  by
translation.
And this, regardless of politics:  The use of translation has not been
ideological.  There are activists, and passivists, on both sides of a polit-
ical divide. (Brandeis, in the context of privacy, was an activist; in the
context of the Fifth Amendment, a passivist.  Rehnquist in the context
of individual rights is a passivist;  in the context of federalism, increas-
ingly  an activist.)  Translation  is  a  practice  that  both  sides  have  en-
gaged;  or alternatively, it is  a practice  that can  be  engaged  both for
(what are seen to be) liberal  and conservative ends.
But however much translation  explains, as we have  described it so
far, there is much that it seems nonetheless to miss.  Put most simply,
if translation responds  to changes in context, sometimes  the changes
in reading have been much quicker than the changes in context; some-
times they have not been quick enough.  There is a gap in the account
that translation offers-a limit to how much it explains  so far.
This  gap, I want to argue,  flows from  the special problems  of for-
ward translation-more  precisely from constraints imposed upon for-
ward  translation in  the  context  of law.  These  constraints  have  two
sources.  The first ties  to  the specific  institution  making  the transla-
tion-to the costs that institution faces  in making a  translation.  Our
focus here is the judiciary.  Judicial  action, like any action, has a social
meaning.5'  That social meaning is in some sense fixed in the context
within which the Court acts-fixed in the sense  that the  Court is not
free, at the moment of action,  simply to change  it.  It is a reality that
constrains  and defines actions within  it.'
The  second source  of  constraint is  that  aspect  of  the  interpretive
context  that I referred  to  at the start  as  relatively uncontested.  My
claim is that shifts in this world of the uncontested in some cases limit,
and in other cases expand, the possible forward translations.  Forward
translation, in a sense, is subject to the world taken for granted, and it
is  disturbed  when  something  that  was  uncontested  now  becomes
contested.
In the second part of this Article, I develop the significance of these
two different complaints.  As a hint, and put most crudely, we could
summarize  their effects  like this:  Translation, in this account,  is sub-
ject to two sorts of constraints.  The first is  this constraint  of institu-
tional cost.  A court will select among forward  translations to find the
51.  See Meaning and Context:  Quentin Skinner and His  Critics 79-96 (James Tully
ed.,  1988).
52.  Jon Elster, The Cement of Society:  A Study of Social Order  109 (1989).
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one that minimizes this institutional cost.  The second is the constraint
of the uncontested:  A forward translation must acknowledge,  or  ac-
cept, what is relatively uncontested in the present interpretive context.
It must accept this, my claim is, whether or not the idea accepted was
accepted at the time  of the Framing.
II.  THE  CONSTRAINTS  OF CONTEXT
Step back for a minute:  There are two types of changes that fidelity
might trouble.  The first is changes of constitutional text, or meaning.
For these, the question is how to recognize and integrate  changes into
a constitutional tradition.  This I understand as the problem of amend-
ment  and the problem  of synthesis.53  The second  is changes  in  the
context of constitutional interpretation-the  change that has been the
focus of the discussion of fidelity above.  Here the question is not how
to recognize, but how to neutralize change-how to preserve a consti-
tution's meaning.  This  I have  called the problem  of translation.
Context  can  change  in many  ways,  and not  all  such  changes  will
count in a calculus  of fidelity.  That cold-car transport is invented will
matter to the scope of the commerce power; that Pennsylvania elects a
governor called Ridge  will not.
I want to focus here on one type of change in the interpretive con-
text that plays  a central role in explaining much of our constitutional
past, but which is strikingly absent from interpretive  accounts.  Else-
where  I  have  described  this  change  as  the  change  of  uncontested
discourses-from  uncontested  to  contested,  or contested  to  uncon-
tested. 4  In what follows, I will expand this idea somewhat, both in its
definition,  and application.
The point of the distinction is this:  As I have just argued, the prob-
lem of constitutional fidelity is in part institutional.  It is the problem
of how,  and whether,  a particular institution-here, the courts-can
carry into effect a practice of interpretive fidelity.  Such a practice has
costs,  and these  costs  are  constraints  on  the practice  of fidelity.  To
understand the potential of the practice, we must focus more carefully
on the nature of these costs, and the nature of the institution that will
bear these costs.
Costs in this context are of two kinds, each  quite important to insti-
tutional  survival,  but only one of which will  be my focus  here.  The
first kind we might call legitimacy costs.  Legitimacy  costs are incurred
when  a court resists  political  pressure  in  a way  that  appears  wholly
appropriate  for that  court.  These  are cases  where  a  court does that
53.  I have  studiously ignored  this problem in the account I offer here.  Indeed, I
have no doubt distorted a complete account in my effort to pretend all is just transla-
tion and its constraints.  The best of synthesis is Bruce Ackerman. See Bruce Acker-
man,  We the People:  Foundations  (1991).
54.  See Lessig,  Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 4, at 410-14.
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which,  in context, has a social meaning appropriate for the court, but
which nonetheless risks something.  United States v. Nixon"  is the best
example  here:  What  the  Court  did  was  appropriate;  yet  it  risked
Nixon's  snub.  And  had  Nixon  ignored  the  Court,  the  institutional
consequences  may indeed have been great.56
The second cost we could call illegitimacy costs. These are costs that
a court suffers when, in context, it acts in ways that appear inappropri-
ate for a court-actions that have a social meaning inappropriate for a
court.  The  easiest  example  here  is  (from  our present  perspective)
Lochnerizing-where  the court seems to weigh competing political in-
terests within the economic sphere,  and override  the same judgment
by  a legislature.  When  a  court  "does  what  is  right"  in  the  face  of
strong political opposition, it suffers a legitimacy cost.  When  it "does
what  is easy"-for  example, when it decides  a case for what appears
to be a political reason, it suffers an illegitimacy cost.
Legitimacy costs are important in emerging constitutional  democra-
cies; the ideal strategy for them is to suffer them just shy of the point
where a political reaction is  provoked.  They are investments in insti-
tutional  capital.  Illegitimacy  costs are important  in an  extant, stable
constitutional  democracy;  the ideal strategy for them is, all things be-
ing equal, to avoid them.
My focus  in what  follows  is  upon illegitimacy  costs.  It is both  to
identify the essence  of "illegitimacy"  for us-what  is  the action  that
yields that social meaning-and to understand what creates the condi-
tions when this illegitimacy exists.  Illegitimate actions are "political,"
but the content of that appellation is quite varied.  My aim is to under-
stand what this charge might mean.
To do this, I focus on a subset of all these cases where judicial action
might be "political. '57  These are cases where judicial action  is at one
time legitimate, but is later rendered  illegitimate or political.  My claim
is not that the action is political.  (I don't know what it would mean to
say that  in  the  abstract,  and  even  if it  could  be said,  I  don't  care
whether it is or is not.)  My focus is on institutional cost, and institu-
tional cost is suffered by how the decision appears, not by what it is.58
The question  I want to consider  is just what is it for us that makes  a
55.  418 U.S. 683  (1974).
56.  Nixon's Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, Melvin Laird, feared Nixon would not
obey a court order. See John  Herbers, Nixon  Loses Again, One Court to Go, N.Y.
Tunes, Oct. 14, 1973, § IV, at 4.  Alex Bickel expressed the same concern. See Alexan-
der Bickel, The Tapes, Cox and Nixon, The New Republic, Sept. 23, 1973, at 13.  This
weighed heavily on Elliot Richardson,  when he was called upon to decide what to do
with the special prosecutor,  Cox. See Elliot Richardson, The Creative Balance 34-47
(1976).
57. The broader category  (that I will  not address  here)  includes  the  politics im-
plicit in the Frankfurter constraint, which I discuss in Lessig,  Translating  Federalism,
supra note 39, at 170-80.
58.  Compare  Deborah Hellman, The Importance  of Appearing Principled,  37 Ariz.
L. Rev. 1107 (1995).
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decision  appear  illegitimate.  Precisely:  First, how is  it that a  reason
that may at one time be legitimate  is rendered illegitimate,  and sec-
ond, how does a court then respond when faced with this illegitimate
reason.
A.  Rendered Meanings:  The Rate-Making Cases
I want to approach this question by considering  it in the somewhat
obscure context of the rate-making cases of the late nineteenth, early
twentieth  century.  For in the story of these cases  we will  see some-
thing of a pattern that reaches far beyond these cases alone.  It is this
pattern that will  explain what translation seems to leave  out.
Substantive  due  process  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was
born in  the battle  over legislative  control of rates-rates of both (1)
public utilities and railroads, and (2) businesses affected with a public
interest.  The ability of states to regulate both was upheld in the gag-
gle  of cases  decided under the name of Munn v. Illinois, 59 but it was
only the lead  case, Munn, that really raised  any great  concern  at the
time.
It was well accepted  that the rates of railroads  and public utilities
could  be regulated  by the state:  Under the rights/privileges  distinc-
tion, the state's power to regulate the rates of public utilities and rail-
roads  followed  quite  naturally  from  the  state's  responsibility  for
creating them.  (Or at least, the power followed so far as the state was
responsible-through  subsidies,  or through  delegating the powers  of
eminent domain, or through corporate charters).
But the power to regulate "businesses  affected with a public inter-
est"  was,  at the time,  more  questionable-both  the  grounds  of the
power, and its reach.  There seemed  always to be a perspective from
which a business was affected with the public interest;60 thus it seemed
possible  that  the prices  of  any  business  would  be within  legislative
control.  This implication of Munn begged for limit and the Court was
quick to supply it.
The first hint was  in  The Railroad Commission Cases,61 where  the
Court deployed a pretext analysis  for testing the legitimacy of a state
regulation.6 2  But the real  change came  in  Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul  Railway v. Minnesota, 63 where the Court held that judicial review
of  the  "reasonableness"  of  governmentally  imposed  rates  was  re-
quired.64 The Constitution henceforth  protected not just property (in
the common  law  sense  of possession and title) but  also  the value  of
property (not a common law  concern).
59.  94 U.S.  113  (1876).
60.  This was Field's problem with the case. See id. at 139-41 (Field, J., dissenting).
61.  116  U.S. 307  (1886).
62.  ld. at 331.
63.  134  U.S. 418 (1890).
64.  Id. at 456-58.
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The only question  was how to draw  the line-between  reasonable
and unreasonable,  or between  "regulation"  and  "confiscation."  For
the jurists  of the late nineteenth  century, in  the era of formalism,  or
conceptualism, this was no mean feat.  The jurisprudence of the time
demanded categorical rules, but there was no categorical line to divide
the reasonable  from the unreasonable.
After a few years of struggle, the Court finally fixed on a test.  The
case was Smyth v. Ames.65 Nebraska had ordered a reduction in intra-
state rail rates by an average  of 29.5%.66  This,  the Court found, was
too much.  It was too much under any number of the then competing
theories for determining whether  a regulation was  a confiscation,  but
Justice Harlan used the case to fix upon one of these competing theo-
ries.  What was determinative, Harlan said, was "the fair value of the
property being used,"  and to determine  that fair value, Harlan  listed
what to us  will seem just a hodgepodge  of factors.67
In context, however,  this list had a very specific  meaning.  As Ste-
phen Siegel has argued, by selecting this list, Harlan was also selecting
a test known as  the reproduction  cost approach  to rate regulation. ° 6
The  reproduction  cost  approach  evaluated  the  fairness  of rates  by
comparing  them  to  the present value  of the  assets  being  regulated,
understood by some to be the replacement cost.  The main competing
theory  at the time made  the  "fair return" depend  upon  the original
cost of the assets.  The political significance of the difference  between
these two theories was  plain:  In a  time of falling prices, the original
cost theory would protect rates more than  the replacement  cost the-
ory; and in a time of inflation, the replacement cost theory would pro-
tect rates more than  the original  cost theory.  This  fact was not lost
upon  the theories'  proponents,  and  Siegel describes  well  the embar-
rassing flips that proponents of either theory had to take as the econ-
omy moved from a deflationary  to an  inflationary period.69
For our purposes, however, the significance  of both theories  is not
the  disagreement  between  them  but  the common  ground  that both
presumed.  This common ground was a theory of economics.  Both the
original and replacement  cost theories were born  out of classical  (as
opposed  to  neoclassical)  economics.  Classical  economics  viewed
value as  "intrinsic."  Prices may vary, but they varied around  a "natu-
ral quantity."7  This natural quantity-the value of an asset-was di-
vided into its  exchange  value  (represented by its price)  and  "natural
value,"  "toward  which exchange  value gravitated  in the long run."71
65.  169 U.S. 466 (1898).
66.  Id  at 499.
67.  Id. at 546-47.
68.  Stephen A. Siegel,  Understanding  the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Contro-
versy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 Va.  L. Rev.  187, 227 (1984).
69.  See id. at 222-23.
70.  Id. at 244.
71.  Id. at 246.
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So understood,  value was  a fact.  If it was  "intrinsic,"  then it was
something that could be found, or discovered.  The finding, or the dis-
covery, might be difficult, but that didn't change the ontological status
of what was being sought.  There was something objective here, which
could be discovered without disturbing  what was being discovered.
This view about value was not just the view of the dominant theory
of the time, but of every leading economic  theory.  If value could be
"found,"  then there was no reason in principle  that courts could not
facilitate  that discovery.  Where  the question  was a question  of fact,
there was nothing illegitimate about  a court making that factual find-
ing.  Courts might get it wrong, or might even (because of incapacity)
systematically get it wrong.  But error does not establish illegitimacy.72
"Value"  was a  fact, because  classical  economics  so viewed  it, and
because  classical economics was presupposed by the major competing
theories  of  valuation  at  the  time  of  Smyth.  Late  in  the  nineteenth
century, however,  this presupposition began to change.  By the end of
the nineteenth century, classical economics was dying, and with it, the
theory  of value that made the value of an asset  "intrinsic."
Born in  the work  of Marshall,  neoclassical  economics  quickly  re-
placed  classical  economics  as  the  dominant  school  of  economic
thought.  As Phyllis Deane put it, by the early twentieth century  "all
mainstream English and American economists had adopted its funda-
mental points. 73  Central among these fundamental points was a new
view  of value:  Value, for the neoclassicist, or marginalist  economist,
was  not  "intrinsic"  or  "natural."  No  single  force  drove  it  towards
equilibrium.  Instead, "value  [was the] product of joint causation-the
resolution  of the relative strength of many  conflicting influences. '74
Among  these "conflicting  influences"  was one that was quite rele-
vant to  the  constitutional  inquiry  into  "reasonable  rates."  For  the "value"  of an asset, according to neoclassical  economics, was in part a
function of the price the asset was permitted in the market.  Whether
by law, or as the result of competition, an asset's value depended upon
how  much  its  product  could  be  sold  for  in  the  market.  Thus,  the
"value"  of a power plant was a function in part of the rates the power
plant  could  charge  for the  electricity  it produced.  But  the rate  the
power plant could charge was the very thing at issue in the rate-mak-
ing cases.
72.  So,  for example, with  little faith that they will not reach erroneous  decisions
consistently, we still find it legitimate to have juries in patent cases. Compare Gregory
D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement  Liti-
gation, 67  U. Colo. L. Rev.  623  (1996)  ("No  warrant  appears for  distinguishing  the
submission of legal questions to a jury in patent cases from such submissions routinely
made in other types  of cases.").
73.  Phyllis Deane, The Evolution of Economic  Ideas  99 (1978).
74.  Siegel, supra note  68, at 245.
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If value turns in part upon the rate permitted by law, then that insti-
tution-the  courts-charged  with  setting  the  rates  faced  an  "ines-
capable  circularity. '75  The  "value"  of  the  asset  depends upon  the
rates the owners may charge.  It is not something independent  of the
rates.  Thus there is no fact of the matter about what the value of an
asset is, without resolving first what the rates will be.  No "natural"  or
"intrinsic" value anchors the asset's value; value is just what the rates
allow.  And thus, as economics was  coming to teach, there was no in-
dependent way of determining what the value of an asset was, as the
necessary  predicate to determining whether rates were too low.
All this meant that from the perspective of neoclassical  economics,
the setting of a rate would in part determine the value of the asset.  It
would therefore  reflect  a  question  of policy-how  much should the
asset be valued.  It would be a matter of judgment,76 the stuff of pol-
icy, not a matter  of fact.  Put most crudely,  nothing  external  to  the
court  would  determine  it, yet to  sustain  a judicial  appearance,  the
court needed something  external to rely upon.  As James  Bonbright
put the economists'  point:
[C]ourts refer to the determination of a rate base as one of "finding
out" what the "present value" or "fair value" of the property really
is, whereas  the  economists  refer  to  the same  problem  as  one  of
choosing a proper  rate base-of deciding how much  the property
should be permitted  to be  worth  rather  than of  discovering how
much it actually is worth.77
Against the background  of neoclassical economics, then, the deter-
mination of  an  asset's "value"  seems  more a  choice,  than  a  finding;
against the background of classical economics it was the reverse.  This
difference in theory then matters greatly to the rhetorical position of a
court deciding  a rate-making  case.  A theory in economics  changed,
and the legitimacy  of court action changed  as well.
The  significance  of this  story  is  this:  It does  not matter  whether
neoclassical  economics was really taken for granted by all at the time;
it does not matter whether it was contested  or not.  All  that matters
here is that the legitimacy of the old way  of finding value hung upon
classical  economics.  Whether  classical  economics  had been defeated
or merely  effectively questioned, it was certainly the case that it had
been successfully drawn into doubt.  It was a contested discourse, and
its very contestedness created a cost for jurists continuing the practice
75.  Under the neoclassical  view,  "[v]alue  was  the equivalent  of exchange  value;
exchange value was the equivalent  of capitalized  earnings;  capitalized  earnings were
dependent upon rates.  Without the notion of intrinsic value,  the circular relationship
between value  and rates was  inescapable."  Id  at 246.
76.  Missouri Ex. Rel.  Southwestern  Bell Tel.  Co.  v.  Missouri, 262 U.S.  276, 289
(1923)  (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
77. 2  James  C.  Bonbright,  The  Valuation  of  Property  1081  (1937)  (emphasis
added).
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of determining whether rates were reasonable or not. For of course, if
the court followed the old views of classical economics, its finding was
a  "finding."  But in a world where classical  economics is just one of a
number of competing views,  a court so disposed  would  have to first
choose to follow classical economics.  That choice could not pretend to
be a  choice  of fact.  In  the  highly  contested  and politically  charged
context  within  which  this  battle  got  litigated,  the  choice  to  follow
classical  economics  would  be seen  as  a political choice.  A choice  of
policy,  taken because  of pragmatic  consequences,  is just  the  sort of
stuff courts  are  not to  consider  when  such  considerations  compete
with the equivalent considerations  of a legislature.  Once the matter is
viewed  as a matter of policy, it follows quite quickly that the matter is
a matter for legislatures, not courts.
This change in the discourse of economics, then, had a radical effect
on  a discourse  within law.  It had this effect because the change  ren-
dered illegitimate an activity that  before the  court could  quite  easily
engage.  Continuing an active police of legislative rates would  create,
after the questioning of classical economics, what I called above, ille-
gitimacy costs.  These  in turn would  drive the Court to adopt a more
deferential  attitude  towards  legislative  judgment.  "Reasonableness"
would become  an excuse  for deference  rather than  a justification  to
intervene.78
A contested discourse (here, economics) yielded  a more deferential
attitude by the  Court.  One might be tempted to generalize from this
conclusion, to the view that wherever matters are contested, this con-
test calls for deference  by the  Court.  (I have  been  so tempted,  and
this seems to be a siren that is quite catching.)79  But the inference is a
mistake,  as I explore at length in the last section of this Article.  The
story I have just sketched about the response to contestation turns not
upon the fact of contestation  so  much as  the  relative position of the
Court versus  other institutions, given this contestation.
As I will argue below, the (legitimate) judicial response to contesta-
tion  is  sometimes  to  defer;  but in  an  extremely  important  class  of
cases,  the legitimate  response is just the opposite.  In some contexts,
the response to such a change  (where a reason moves from appropri-
ate to inappropriate) is for the court to become less active, more def-
erential;  in  other contexts,  the  response  is  for  the  court  to become
more active, and less deferential.
But this is to get ahead  of the story.  To understand this difference,
and to understand how such differences  track constitutional doctrine,
78.  The relaxation  happens in Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural  Gas  Co.,
320 U.S. 591  (1944)  and Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S.
575  (1942).
79.  I was expansive  about deference  in Lawrence  Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw,
104 Yale L.J. 1743  (1995).  For an additional  discussion about deference,  see Cass R.
Sunstein,  Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996).
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I need first to say a bit more about this notion of contestation.  That I
do in the balance  of this part.  In the next part, I  then describe con-
texts  within  which this  change  induces  judicial  passivity.  Finally, in
the last section, I describe contexts within  which  this change induces
activism.  In both contexts, the change I am describing  is a change  in
the context of interpretation; the effort then is to understand how, and
why, a theory of fidelity as  translation  responds as  it does.
B.  How Contests Render Meaning
My account here rests upon a certain sociology of knowledge.  The
claim  is  that from  a  given  perspective,  discourses  will appear  either
contested,  or  uncontested  (obviously,  relatively  contested,  or  rela-
tively uncontested, but for ease of exposition, I will stick with the sim-
pler  description).  By  "contested"  I  mean  a  discourse  where
fundamentals in  that discourse  appear up for grabs;  that participants
in that discourse  acknowledge  the  legitimacy  of disagreement  about
these fundamentals; that disagreement is a sign of normalcy for a par-
ticipant, not oddness.
An uncontested discourse is much the opposite.  Here people don't,
in  the  main, disagree  about  fundamentals.  In  the  main,  they  don't
think much about fundamentals  at all.  People act, or argue, instead,
taking  these fundamentals  for granted.  Life  here is  normal  science.
One could conceivably  question fundamentals;  one could legitimately
express doubt.  But if one insisted upon these doubts, or was relentless
in  these questions,  then  one  would  mark  oneself  as  odd; somehow
outside the discourse.  Doubts are "doubts" only because some doubts
are pathology.
Much  more  must  be  said  to make  the  distinction  here  useful  (or
even clear).  But an example may suggest its essence.  Think about the
difference  between discourse about abortion, and discourse  about in-
fanticide.  People have views about abortion that they believe are cor-
rect; they also understand that views about abortion are contested.  It
is  normal  to find someone  who  disagrees  with  you;  disagreement  is
expected. All know what they think; and all know that what they think
is contested.
The same is not true about views  about infanticide.  People believe,
with relatively little contest, that infanticide  is wrong.  Again, conceiv-
ably, in  a  philosophy  seminar  perhaps,  one could  imagine  disagree-
ment about whether infanticide is morally just or not; one could even
imagine  cases  where  most  would  agree  that it  is  perfectly justified.
But  these  two  qualifications  don't  undermine  the  category:  Views
about infanticide  are just not on the table  of dispute  in the way that
views about abortion are.  If one seemed genuinely puzzled about the
question of infanticide;  if one announced  to the world his genuine be-
lief that infanticide  is just fine,  then  one  would  do more  than mark
oneself as  an opponent.  Worse, one would mark oneself as odd.
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Now  oddness  is not perpetual-think  about the odd birds  at  Chi-
cago whose views are now quite mainstream.  For neither is it stable.
Indeed, we better understand  the instability I want  to describe  if we
complicate  the story  a bit.  A more  complete  account  would distin-
guish  both  between whether  a  discourse  is  contested  (an  empirical
question about the extent  of agreement  within  a particular  commu-
nity), and between whether a discourse is in the foreground, or back-
ground,  of  social  consciousness  (another  empirical  question  about
whether  the discourse  is  a  "visible"  issue,  or  one for the most part
ignored).  The  possibilities  would  be  described  by  the  following
matrix:
contested  uncontested
foreground  [1]:  abortion  [2]:  sexual
harassment
background  [4]: button-down  [3]:  infanticide shirts  [3]:_infanticide
Discourses in box [1]  are paradigms  of contested terrain.  They not
only mark  out areas of actual  disagreement  (hence  "contested")  but
they  are  also  areas where  the disagreement  is presently manifest  in
social life.  About these issues,  there are on-going  arguments; people
pay attention to these arguments; people have beliefs about them, but
they also understand that others will disagree.  (These, we might say,
are the sorts  of arguments  one should not engage  at a dinner party.)
Discourses in box [2]  are different.  These  are present in social life;
they represent issues that are being worked  out.  But the premises  of
the resolution are not themselves fundamentally  contested.  Quid-pro-
quo sexual harassment  here is an example:  this (1) still occurs in the
world, (2)  people talk about it and struggle with it, and yet (3) views
about  it  are  relatively  uncontested.  It  is  present  in  the  social
consciousness,  and to the extent that it  occurs,  it is resisted;  but the
fact  that it occurs,  and draws  our attention, does not show that it is
contested.  (These  are  the  arguments  of  dinner  parties  of  relative
strangers,  rather than friends.)
Box [3]  is the opposite of box  [1].  It represents discourses  that are
settled, and not currently at the forefront  of society's attention.  One
might ask people about them, and one would expect a fairly consistent
response.  Infanticide is an example, as already described.  So too with
petty theft. These  are things  we wouldn't think to question.80  And if
they are questioned, the questions are put to rest, quickly, and without
much  interest.  (The  arguments  of  either  failed  dinner  parties,  or
parties  of foreigners.)
80.  United  States  v.  Virginia,  116  S.  Ct.  2264,  2291-92  (1996)  (Scalia,  J.,
dissenting).
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Box  [4]  might  seem  to  be  the  unprovided  for  case,  though  once
seen,  one sees  that it is  not so  uncommon.  It represents  discourses
where, if one were to inquire, disagreement would be revealed; but for
whatever  reason, this  disagreement  does not  manifest  itself, or if it
does, it is generally ignored.  By definition, it is hard to come up with
examples  of this.  But here's one that I've recently noticed.
What is a "button-down  shirt"?  I should have thought the meaning
of a "button-down shirt" was clear-it is a shirt where the collars are
attached to the front of the shirt with buttons.  A colleague  disagreed,
and at her urging, and with the most unscientific methods possible, we
tested the  disagreement.  We  asked  twenty  people  on  the  street  to
define  "button-down  shirt."  All  but  three  gave  the  following
response:  a  "button-down  shirt"  means  a  shirt  where  there  are
"buttons" "down"  the front of the shirt.
This  is  the  disagreement  of box  [4].  The  disagreement  reveals  a
contest  in views,  but it  is  a  contest that is  not  noticed  in  the  social
sphere.  The disagreement is unnoticed,  and for the most part we can
go on without conflict.  But sometimes,  the conflict is revealed,  and a
contest  can  emerge.  (These  are, of course,  the most dangerous  but
best sorts  of arguments for any sort of party.)
Of  these  four  boxes,  the  most  important  is  box  [3],  for  it  will
establish,  as  I  argue  below,  a  judicial  attitude  at  the  core  of  the
account I offer here.  But the most interesting is box  [4]:  for here rest
the potential political battles; here are the struggles about to break.81
An issue may start  in box  [4];  contest-entrepreneurs  may succeed  in
getting  it thrown  into box  [1];  after  a  period  of  dispute,  it may  get
resolved in some way, but remain in the public's eye;  it then moves to
box [2].  And after some time of stable resolution,  it finally falls into
the background, resolved and unnoticed; something taken for granted
by others; often unnoticed (box [3]).  Of course, nothing assures that a
particular  dispute  will  move  through  all  four  boxes-a  discourse
might, that is, get stuck (as the discourse about abortion seems to have
gotten stuck); or a contest might never rise to the level of contested (a
fate that dooms, no doubt, my button-down  shirt example.)  But the
point is that there is movement here-from  one box to another.
One might be skeptical about the value in introducing this notion of
contested and uncontested discourses as a way to understand changed
readings  of the  Constitution.  No  doubt  the line  between  contested
and uncontested is fuzzy,  and no simple way to make the fuzzy clear
seems apparent.  But that there is an  effect here I don't think can be
denied, and that we can't discern the effect with perfect accuracy does
not mean  we should ignore it.
81.  I have  not tried  to link  this matrix  with  more mature  descriptions  in social
theory, though the connections should be obvious.  See especially the introduction  to
Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, Of Revelation  and Revolution  (1991).
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If you  doubt the effect,  think about just  one example-the  rise  of
"sexual  harassment"  in  discrimination  law.  Before  the  late  1970s,
there  was  no  such  thing  as  "sexual  harassment"  in  discrimination
law-or  better,  before  1980,  the  law  would  not  have  seen  sexual
harassment  as  sex  discrimination.'  This of  course has  changed.  In
large part, the change is  the product  of perhaps the  most important
contest-entrepreneurs  of  the  last  decade-feminists,  Catharine
MacKinnon  in  particular.  Through  a  series  of  legal  challenges  to
practices  that we  would now call  harassment, MacKinnon  succeeded
in  taking  a  wrong  that  was  before  unnoticed  (by  the  law),  and
rendering  its permissibility  contested.  After a  (relatively)  short time
of contest, this wrong was recognized as a wrong, and now, though the
wrong still stands in the foreground of public attention, it is no longer
a contested feature of public debate.  Everyone is now, in this regard
at  least,  a  MacKinnonite;  all  concede  the  discrimination  in  sexual
harassment.
There  is  a  change  here.  The world  is  in this  sense  different  from
how  it  was  just  twenty  years  ago.  It  is  a  change  that  occurred
extremely  quickly.  An idea was  thrown before the legal  system, and
the  legal system got it.  Why it got it (while not getting other similar
ideas  about equality83) is  a  complex question.  But that it  did shows
something  of the power of an  idea to destabilize  other ideas.
Discourse about harassment, however, has not moved through a full
cycle.  It still stands in the foreground  of society's attention.  There is,
however,  another  ready  example  of  a  discourse  that  has  moved
through all four stages.  For reasons that will become apparent later, I
want to sketch that progression here.
82.  See  generally  B.  Glenn  George,  The  Back  Door:  Legitimizing  Sexual
Harassment Claims, 73  B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1993)  (reviewing sexual  discrimination law).
For a history, see  Susan Estrich,  Sex  at Work,  43  Stan.  L.  Rev.  813,  816-26  (1991)
(sketching  development  of claim).  Within law, it was Catharine A. MacKinnon  who
constructed  the category and linked it to  employment  discrimination. See generally
Catharine  A. MacKinnon,  Sexual Harassment  of Working  Women:  A Case  of Sex
Discrimination  (1979)  (recounting  the  history  and  development  of  the concept  of
sexual harassment).
83.  Professor MacKinnon, for example,  defines inequality as follows:  "Inequality
means  practices  that  disadvantaged  traditionally  subordinated  peoples  through
imposing  inferiority  on  them,  on  a  group  basis."  Catharine  A.  MacKinnon,
Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional  Theory, Fordham University School of Law 197
(Sept. 21, 1996) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).  I completely agree
with this  definition.  What interests me, however, is why certain such inequalities are
seen  as  inequalities,  and  others  are  not.  For  example,  "attractiveness"  or
"hideousness"  are statuses  imposing inferiority  or its opposite  on people on a group
basis,  that  are  not  now  conceived  of as  "inequality"  for  purposes  of  the  Equal
Protection  Clause.  One  wants  to  know  why,  or  more  importantly,  one  wants  to
understand  the  process  that  includes  some  of  these  inequalities,  while  excluding
others.  See Note,  Facial Discrimination:  Extending Handicap Law  to  Employment
Discrimination  on the Basis of Physical  Appearance, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 2035  (1987).
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The example is the history of psychiatry's treatment of the topic of
homosexuality.  For some time, psychiatry treated homosexuality as a
pathology;  this  view  within  psychiatry  was  fairly  well  established.'
That  it  was pathological  was taken  for  granted  by  most  within  the
profession.  It is a discourse, then, that begins in this matrix at box [3].
Sometime  in  the  late  1960s,  however,  it  began  to  be  clear  that
judgments  about  homosexuality  were  no  longer  uniform.  Doctors
began  questioning  the  traditional  understanding  of  homosexuality.
Privately, they adopted different  techniques of treatment.  But for the
most part, the issue  was  invisible  from  social,  or psychological,  life.
The dissent, to the extent  it existed, was not registered.  This period
may be thought of as within  box [4].
In the  early 1970s,  gay  activists  took advantage  of this  dissent;  it
began  to  be  registered;  they  had regulated  it.  Through  a  series  of
events,  both  political  and  scientific,  they  forced  psychologists  to
reconsider  the  medical  status  of homosexuality.  Quite  quickly,  this
moved the discourse into box [1].
This battle first occurred in the context of the American  Psychiatric
Association ("APA"), the body charged with determining the content
of psychiatry's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
("DSM").'  The DSM defined homosexuality as a disorder.'  In 1970,
during  the  annual  meeting  of  the  APA  in  San  Francisco,  gay  and
lesbian  activists  organized  large  and  effective  protests  of  this DSM
categorization.  These protests continued  at the next meeting, and in
1972,  for the  first  time,  the  APA  organized  an  open  panel  on  the
nonpatient  homosexual.  The  following  year,  discussion  focused  on
"the  extent  to  which  heterosexual  biases  had  colored  the  work  of
psychiatrists."'   The same  year,  the  board  and  membership  of  the
APA approved  a  change  in  the psychiatric  status  of homosexuality,
ending its classification  as a  psychopathic condition.as
After  the  APA  resolved  the  question  as  it  did,  and  after  its
resolution  was  accepted,  the  discourse  about  the  status  of
homosexuality  moved to box [2].  The issue remained  for a number of
years  at the  center of the APA's  attention. 9  But it remained  there
resolved in just  the opposite  way from when  it was  in  box  [4].  The
84.  I discuss this cycle in Lessig,  Understanding  Changed Readings, supra note 4,
at 415-19.  Again, this is not to deny that there were dissenters. See id.
85.  See American Psychiatric  Ass'n, Diagnostic  and Statistical  Manual of Mental
Disorders (4th ed. 1994).
86.  American  Psychiatric  Ass'n,  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental
Disorders 44 (2d ed. 1968).
87.  Ronald  Bayer,  Homosexuality  and  American  Psychiatry:  The  Politics  of
Diagnoses 112  (1981).
88.  Id.  at 137.
89.  Immediately after the first resolution,  "conservatives"  in  the field tried to get
the question reopened in the next APA meeting. They failed.  Id. at 4.
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practice  of psychology had to be reformed by this new understanding;
and for a  time, it was.
Psychiatry  is  now at a  stage when the status  of homosexuality  has
fallen  back  to  box  [3].  It  is  taken  for  granted  now,  that  is,  that
homosexuality  is  not "psychopathic."  One within this  field who  said
that it was would not just be expressing a dissenting view, as he might
when the discourse was in box [1]  or [2]; he would be instead marking
himself as  an outsider.
I have described this cycle from the perspective of people within the
field of psychiatry.  From the perspective  of law-that is, from outside
the perspective  of psychiatry-the  cycle  is  a bit  less  complex.  It is
when  the  discourse  is  backgrounded  that  law  can  rely  upon  its
judgments;  and when the  discourse is  foregrounded,  law must  avoid
taking sides  in its  dispute.  When the discourse  is foregrounded,  law
treats the  discourse  as it might treat contested  facts,  in a motion for
summary judgment;  but  when the  discourse  is  backgrounded, it  can
take  the  facts  of  the  discourse  for  granted  in  resolving  whatever
question it may need  to resolve.
But how,  in  an example  like the  example  of the  APA, could  this
contested  discourse  matter  to  law?  One  way  it  might  matter  is
suggested  in  an  opinion  interpreting  the  Immigration  Act in  1982.90
The Immigration  Act of 1965 made  ineligible aliens  "afflicted  with a
psychopathic personality,  or  sexual deviation,  or  a mental  defect." 91
Those terms  originally had a medical  origin-they were  drawn  from
the  then  existing  medical  understandings  of  the  condition  of
homosexuality.
By  1982,  those  medical  understandings  had  changed.  As  I
described,  the APA  had  redefined  its  status,  and in  1979,  following
that  lead,  Surgeon  General  Julius  Richmond  announced  that
"homosexuality per se will no longer be considered a 'mental  disease
or defect."' 92
This created a problem for the INS:  Under its procedures,  an alien
suspected  of  homosexuality  had  been  referred  to  a  public  health
service doctor, who would  certify that the alien was homosexual, and
therefore  (under  the  medical  understanding  of  the  time)  had  a
"mental  defect."  The  implication  was  automatic  from  the  DSM
judgment  about homosexuality,  and  the  finding  that a  person  was a
homosexual.
But  once  psychiatry  changed,  the  implication  was  not  so  easily
drawn.  Indeed,  doctors  within the Public Health  Service  refused  to
draw it.  And if doctors refused to draw it, then, Judge  Aguilar held,
90.  Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D.  Cal. 1982),
aff'd, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th  Cir. 1983).
91.  Id  at 572.
92.  Id
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homosexual  aliens  could  not  be excluded  under  this  statute.93  The
statute  relied  upon  the  judgment  of  science;  when  that  judgment
changed, law would have to change  as well.  Law was subject to these
discourses,  and vulnerable to their change.
We can draw the conclusion so far like this:  Legal discourse in part
rests upon discourses outside of law.  It is, in a sense, hostage to these
discourses outside law.  It relies upon them to sustain the appearance
of legitimacy within  its own, plainly legal, sphere.  But it is vulnerable
when they change.
In  the  examples  we  have  seen,  these  backgrounded,  non-legal
discourses permit a discourse within law to make judgments about the
world that appear true, and not political;  fact-like, not policy-driven.
But  if  these  backgrounded  discourses  change-if  they  become
contested,  or are  drawn  into  doubt-then just  as  certainly  they can
render a discourse within law political by removing  the supports to a
particular judgment that before had been supplied  by the absence  of
contest within  a given  non-legal  discourse.  So  again,  when  classical
economics was relatively uncontested, judges could "find"  the value of
regulated  assets;  when  psychiatry  condemned  homosexuals  to
pathology, judges and  legislators  could  simply exclude  them  as sick.
But when these earlier discourses became contested, judges could not
so  easily "find"  what  before they could:  When finding value seemed
more  like making  value,  it rendered  the judges'  position vulnerable;
when science plainly did not (or did not plainly) support the exclusion
of homosexuals as  sick, judicial exclusion appeared  as  prejudice.
These examples are not isolated cases.  They mark, I want to argue,
a pattern pervasive in American constitutional law.  This pattern helps
explain  what  may  appear  to  be  gaps  in  translation's  account  of
constitutional  fidelity.  And  it  points  to  what  I  have  suggested  is
missing in much of constitutional theory, whether fidelitist or not-to
the place, that is, of these contested and uncontested  discourses in an
interpretive context.
In the remaining  two  sections,  I  want  to sketch  the  effect of  this
pattern in two very different contexts.  The first will seem much  like
the  two examples  that I have  already  reviewed:  In  these, there is  a
discourse  that becomes  contested;  this  renders  a  juridical  discourse
political;  this then raises the illegitimacy costs for the Court engaging
that discourse, and the response is for the Court to adopt an attitude
that is more deferential-or  as I will call it, passive.
But  contest  in  the  second  context  yields  precisely  the  opposite
judicial response.  Here the effect is  not to induce judicial  passivity.
Instead,  in  this  context, the effect  emboldens  the judicial  response.
Here,  the  Court  gambles  with  a  kind  of  legitimacy,  rather  than
93.  Id. at 584.
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illegitimacy  cost.  The  response  is  activism,  though  an  activism
perhaps  tempered  by prudence.
C.  Rendering Passive: Erie, et al.
So far my story has been about contestation in discourses outside of
law.  Judges from within law, the story goes, respond to this cycle  of
contestation in discourses without law, when contestation renders de-
cisions within law "political."
In this section, I examine contests within law-discourses within law
that become contested, and hence render the same, or a different, dis-
course  within  law  "political."  As  we  will  see  the  pattern  is  similar.
For reasons  that will become  plain, I call  the pattern the  Erie-effect,
though the consequences  of its effect are quite different in two differ-
ent contexts.
The model is the case of Erie R.R.  v. Tompkins, 94 and the changes
that Erie yields.  You recall the basic story:  For more than ninety-six
years, federal courts had been "finding" what was called a federal gen-
eral common law.  They were doing so under an authority ratified by
Justice Story in Swift  v. Tyson.95  Swift was a reading  of the Rules  of
Decision  Act of 1789, permitting federal courts to ignore state court
judgments  in  matters  of  "general  common  law."  As  Story  there
wrote:
It never has been supposed  by us, that the section did apply, or was
designed  to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all
dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and perma-
nent operation, as, for example, to the construction of ordinary con-
tracts ....  and  especially  to the questions  of general  commercial
law,  where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like
functions as ourselves, that is, to  ascertain upon general reasoning
and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or in-
strument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of com-
mercial law to govern the case....  The  law respecting  negotiable
instruments  may  be  truly  declared  in  the  language  of  Cicero,
adopted by Lord Mansfield ...  to be in a great measure, not the law
of a  single country only, but of the commercial world.
9 6
Erie put  an end  to  that practice.  There  was  no "federal  general
common  law,"97 the Erie Court said; federal courts must follow state
courts  interpreting  state common  law, just as  they must follow  state
courts interpreting state statutes.  No longer could federal courts sim-
ply divine what the common law  was, as  if appealing to some oracle
brooding in the background; law  "in the sense in which  courts speak
of it today," the Court then said, "does not exist without some definite
94.  304 U.S. 64  (1938).
95.  41  U.S. (16  Pet.)  1 (1842).
96.  Id at 18-19  (emphasis  added).
97.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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authority behind it." s 98  And unless the federal court could point to the
state law authority for the common law they were announcing, it was
the Court that, quite unconstitutionally,  was providing  this authority.
There is a drama to the opinion in Erie that is difficult to resist.  An
idea of philosophy-about the nature of "law"-changes,  and a prac-
tice 100 years old is reversed.  On the authority of the retired Holmes,
Brandeis  shows  us  our mistake; jurists  before  thought  the  common
law found, we now see it is made.99
Drama, but perhaps too much drama.  It is the story of a grand mis-
understanding-the  Hope  Diamond  found  to  be  quartz.  (One  can
just see the PBS episode recounting the story:  Brandeis and his clerks
working late into the evening;  Brandeis,  in a  flash, says  "Wait.  Just a
second. I've got it. The common  law isn't found; the common  law is
made. Swift is unconstitutional!;"  music rises; the clerks cheer; credits
role; lights fade as "excellent, my dear Watson" echoes mysteriously in
the room.)
Ideas  don't change  like  this, misunderstandings  of Kuhn  notwith-
standing.  The practice that had grown out of Swift was a mistake, but
it was not a 100 year old mistake, discovered in a flash.  To understand
it, we must put it in  context.  And in the  next few pages  to follow, I
want to describe  the  development  of the  ideas later  associated  with
Swift, by understanding something about this context.  I then describe
their undoing, for it is this undoing that is  the key to the Erie-effect.
As  Swift  came to  be understood,  it invited  related  questions.  Its
rhetoric said that the  common law was  "found,"  but this just invited
two  sorts  of  skepticism:  First-really  found?  How  do  we  know?
How  do we know  the judge didn't just pretend  to find  it?  (This  is
realism's question.)  Second-found  where?  What was the source  of
the law that the federal  common lawyer  looked  to.  (This  is  positiv- ism's question.)  By the time of Erie, both questions pressed hard:  it
was  neither  plausible  that judges  were  really  being  guided  by  any-
thing; nor if they were being guided, that what was guiding them was a
proper source of authority.
But it took a long time for these skepticisms  to mature.  If we can
pick out three understandings  of the common law that competed  dur-
ing these hundred years,  then we will see that these two skepticisms
don't press the same against all three.  I will discuss  them in their or-
der of dominance, but all three  echo  in the writings of the period.
The first is the understanding  of Story  in Swift-an understanding
of  the  common  law which,  if properly  understood,  should  be  quite
untroubling for even  the most committed  positivist.  The key to this
98.  Il  at 79.
99.  Compare William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitu-
tional Revolutions, 62 Tu  L. Rev.  907,  934  (1988)  (referencing  1830s  commentator
that judges should be subjected to democratic  electoral controls because judges were
in fact making  the law).
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first understanding  is the concept of "customary law."  At the time of
the Founding, and certainly  at the time  of Swift, the  common law  at
issue in Swift in large part (though not exclusively'01 ) was "customary
law."  But just what "customary law"  means  is an idea we have lost.
We emphasize the law half in the two part phrase; we would do better
to focus the custom half.  Customary law at the time of Swift is more
like contract than law; it is more like the  obligations of implied con-
tract than the rules of an external  sovereign.  The aim in finding cus-
tomary  law was not to  impose rules  of custom  on  unwilling parties;
rather the aim was simply to protect the expectations  of the parties to
an  exchange,  by  recognizing  the  understandings  that  these  parties
brought  to  the  transaction  themselves.  Customary  law  was a  set of
defaults  which  the  parties,  through  express  agreement,  were  always
free  to  modify.  They  were  understandings  that  the  law  treated  as
agreements.
Within the narrow domain that Swift purported to sweep-what we
call commercial law or the law merchant-the Swift practice then sim-
ply empowered federal courts to engage in the wholly unremarkable
power of finding what the agreement, or understanding, between  the
parties in a commercial transaction was.  In this sense, the court was to
find the agreement, and hence the law.  But in this sense, courts "find"
the  understandings  of the  parties  to  a voluntary  transaction  all  the
time.  This is the sense in which federal courts today, sitting in diver-
sity, "find"  the implied terms of a contract when determining  how to
enforce a contract.1 1 In both cases, the law that is found is simply the
will of the parties-a source  of authority within  this domain  at least
that should not trouble the positivist, and a practice  of finding which
continues today.' 2
100.  Common law in this sense would not have included torts, which were primarily
local concerns.  See Randall Bridwell & Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitution and the
Common Law:  The Decline of the Doctrines of Separation of Powers and Federalism
121  (1977).
101.  The same, for example, with the finding of the laws of nature. See Bradford R.
Clark, Federal  Common Law: A Structural  Reinterpretation,  144 U. Pa. L. Rev.  1245,
1301  (1996).
102.  Compare Bridwell and Whitten's view:
The characteristic  of the common law that we  saw in  earlier chapters pre-
vented violations  of federalism  and separation of powers restrictions  by the
federal courts in diversity cases was its private or customary character.  The
enforcement  of customary  rules by the federal  courts did not implicate  the
sovereign  lawmaking  authority  of any  government,  because  common  law
rules  were  not the product  of a sovereign  voice.  Whether they  were  of a
long standing  or relatively  recent character, or of a general or local charac-
ter, they originated in the private  behavior of parties.  They were "created"
or adverted to by the parties within the "spontaneous order" of the common
law process, which judicially enforced the expectations  of the participants  to
a variety of transactions, rather than permitting judges to promulgate legisla-
tive-like rules  to govern  party behavior ex post facto.
Bridwell  & Whitten, supra note  100,  at 115.
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This however is not the Swift that Erie overturned.  Before we  get
to Erie, the practice born in Swift changed in important ways.  Late in
the century-after, as Bridwell  and Whitten say, 18601 3 -the  federal
general  common  law  of  Swift  took  on  a  very  different  sense.  It
changed in important ways, but it is important to keep focused at least
one way in which it remained the same.
The constant part was the "finding"  part-that throughout the later
evolution of the practice that Swift began, courts still maintained  that
they were being guided in their work by an  external  source.  Law, in
this sense, was still "found."'1  But from where it was found changed
quite dramatically.  While at first it was found (1) in the understand-
ings of the parties, later it was found (2) in the logic of conceptualism,
or formalism, and later still it was found (3) from the practice of other
courts.  The history of the practice that Swift began then is a history of
the changing sources of the common  law; but common throughout is
the view (whether believed or not is  a separate question)  that courts
were still finding this law, whatever  the source.
Why the common  law  shifted  in  the sources  it appealed  to  is an
extraordinarily  rich question, beyond the scope of this essay (and ca-
pacity of this author).  The broad themes are well known:  After 1870,
the range and  complexity  of the economic  transactions  regulated  by
the common  law grew  tremendously.  This no doubt  put great  pres-
sure on a practice  that tracked  custom, both because  customs  don't
exist in times of change, and because the capacity of the court to find
them depends in large part on the understanding the court might have
of these practices.  That understanding is weakened in this period, and
one expects judges were pulled to find another way to articulate what
the common  law was.
Science,  here,  was  a model. 0 5  But science  in the mid-part  of the
nineteenth century was more about ordering and logic than about ex-
103.  See id. at 141.
104. See Casto, supra note 99,  at 934.
This conceit that judges do not make law was still a powerful force in 1921
when  Judge Cardozo  delivered  his Storrs  Lectures  on the judicial  process.
Although he candidly rejected  the old dogma,  Arthur Corbin  reports  that
Cardozo  was  mildly concerned  about publishing  the lectures  and humor-
ously remarked,  "If I were to publish them I would be impeached."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
105.  See, e.g., William P. LaPiana, Logic  and Experience:  The Origin  of Modem
American Legal Education 30 (1994)  (explaining pre-Civil War  view of common law
as  a science conforming  to Bacanian model).  Indeed, some believed that  unless the
common law were considered a science, the common law would be tyranny. Id. at 35
("If law were not a science  (that is, 'if  the subjects of law,-the nature  of man,  the
situation, wants, interests, feelings,  and habits of society,-cannot be classified  upon
general resemblances'),  then the judge's opinion 'is absolutely law.'"); see also Daniel
Mayes, Whether Law Is a Science, 9 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 349, 352-53 (1833)  ("But if
law is not a science..,  then the opinion of the judge is something more than evidence,
it is absolutely law ....  He is not the interpreter, but the maker, of the law;, and in
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periment and discovery.1 06  In the first wave  of reform, the  effect  of
scientism was to  drive the  common law jurist to find  organizing  and
general  principles  to  unite  a  disparate  body  of  precedent. °7  The
search was for the foundations to the collection  of cases the common
law jurist came to know-a collection of cases rendered unfathomably
large in  1870 by the birth of the West Reporter system.'08
One can well understand the pressure that would push common law
courts to something less empirical.1 09  When cases were limited to the
few that the courts could recall, adapting a particular rule to the facts
or understanding  of the  parties  was  relatively  easy.  But when  cases
were reported, and when parties had access to these reports, flexibility
and adaptability become more difficult.  Courts were penned in by this
flood of "precedent,"  and in response they sought a different author-
ity.  This  was  the  authority  of logic,  and  formalism-where  rules
would be deduced in an exercise of logic rather than  discovered from
the messiness  of the cases  to consider." 0
This formalism,  or conceptualism,  is  the second  stage of this  com-
mon law evolution-though again, I don't mean to suggest a progres-
sion,  nor do  I want to argue  about when one idea  might have  been
dominant  over  the  other.  The third stage-launched  by Langdell-
can  be seen  to mix  these  two  traditions.  For  Langdell's  idea was  a
kind of science for the common law; but it wasn't the pure science of
deductivism.  Rather Langdell wanted  to add the empirical  study  of
what courts actually do to the practice  of developing general and for-
mal rules of the common law.  Langdell was building a law school; "I
it may have been no accident then that he was also creating a demand
for a certain kind of legal scholar-the  scientist, removed from prac-
tice,  who  would  investigate  the  reported  cases  from  an  area  of the
him resides that despotic power, which  some political writers imagine must  be com-
mitted to some body of magistracy.").
106.  See LaPiana, supra note  105, at 30; Mayes, supra note  105,  at 349; President
Quincy, President Quincy's Address on the Occasion of the Dedication of Dane Law
College, 9 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 33, 52 (1833); see also Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-
Faire  and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of  the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire  Con-
stitutionalism, 3 Law & Hist. 293,  298-99  (1985)  ("By  'scientific'  nineteenth-century
economists meant the careful classification and definition of terms; they did not mean
the process of hypothesis-formation  and testing that we would today say defines the
scientific  method."); Customs and Origin of Customary Law, 4 Am. Jurist & L. Mag.
28, 33 (1830)  ("The scientific study of jurisprudence then, in our view...  is the consid-
eration  of its  original purpose...  so  as to determine whether  any particular case  is
within the scope of its authority.  ..  ").
107.  See Bridwell & Whitten, supra note 100,  at 125.
108.  See Casto, supra note 99, at 938-40.
109.  See id. at 947.
110.  Of course,  other  changes were  going on  as  well.  The common  law was  ex-
panding to include more, and states were becoming more activist in  the areas  tradi-
tionally reserved to commercial law. See Clark, supra note  101,  at 1290-91.
111.  In a sense he was changing the nature of law school.  Harvard, where Langdell
was dean, long predated  him.
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common  law, and synthesize  them into principles that might  be said
underlay  them.  If  the first  stage  of the common  law  was  empirical,
and the second, logical, the third was  a kind of empirical logic, which
we could call  inductivism.
The importance  of  this story, though,  is  less  in  the  details  of the
historical account-less in the richness of which competing source was
dominant when-and more in the commonality  again that unites this
dispute.  Common law jurists certainly contested how best to conceive
of the source of this common law authority.  But what they didn't con-
test was that the enterprise of the common law was one where judges
were  ultimately  to  be  exogenously  guided-where  judges  didn't
"make" law  in the sense that they decided  what was  best, but rather
"made" law in the sense that they discovered it in the proper common
law way.  As Scalia put the point in a very different  context:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be una-
ware that judges in a real sense "make"  law.  But they make  it as
judges make it, which is  to say as though  they were  "finding"  it-
discerning what  the law  is,  rather  than  decreeing  what it is  today
changed to, or what it will  tomorrow be.
1 2
As the nature  of this external  source shifted-as it moved further
and further away from the understandings  of private parties-the le-
gitimacy of this source of authority was  left, more and more, open to
doubt." 3  And it was  this doubt that Holmes picked up on.  The doc-
trine still associated with Swift began to draw the fire of many,"14 most
furiously on pragmatic grounds,"1 5 but most famously, on philosophi-
cal grounds as well.116  Against Swift's progeny, and the source of law
112.  James  B. Beam Distilling  Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991)  (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
113.  See, e.g.,  John  C. Gray, The Nature and Sources  of the  Law 235-36  (2d ed.
1921)  (describing  critique).
114.  See Tony Freyer, Harmony  & Dissonance:  The Swift & Erie Cases in Ameri-
can Federalism  92, 99 (1981)  (describing attack).
115.  See, e.g., id. at 18 (describing "forum  shopping").
116.  See, e.g., id. at 92-96  (describing the controversy surrounding  Swift); see also
LaPiana, supra  note  105, at 34-35 (elaborating on the distinction between cases as law
or cases as evidence of law); Armistead M.  Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Ty-
son, 16  Va. L. Rev. 225, 231  (1930)  (discussing whether judges make  law or find it);
Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common  Law 181  (1921)  (positing that American
law is developed through judicial decisions).  William C. Chase, in The American Law
School and the Rise of Administrative  Government (1982),  recounted  that:
By the beginning  of the twentieth century, Holmes'  view of the judge  as a
policy maker operating always with an eye to what is expedient was still too
starkly stated for most lawyers.  But the sense that he expressed of a judicial
discretion  to  improvise  in the face  of changing  conditions  was  gaining ac-
ceptance ....
As his conception  of the judicial function  came  increasingly  to resemble
the expediential behavior of administrative  agencies  in deciding  cases, ..
the legal scholar could not escape the conclusion that the agencies possessed
judicial power.  It soon was  accepted as irrefutable.
ld- at 16-17.
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that it now seemed to presuppose, Holmes wrote in 1917:  "The  com-
mon law  is not a brooding omnipresence  in the sky but the articulate
voice  of some sovereign  ....
Nine  years  later,  his  attack  was  trained  directly  (if unfairly)  on
Swift:
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a unit
....  It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one august
corpus, to understand  which  clearly  is the  only task of any  Court
concerned.  If there were such a transcendental  body of law outside
of any particular State but  obligatory within  it unless  and until
changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in
using their independent judgment as to what it was.  But there is no
such body of law.  The fallacy and illusion that I think  exist consist
in supposing that there  is this outside thing to be found.  Law is a
word  used with  different meanings,  but law  in the sense  in which
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite author-
ity behind it.  The common law so far as it is enforced in a State...
is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by
the authority  of that State ....  ll
This  is  the  attack of Holmes  the positivist,  and it hit the  common
law practice at its weakest part.  For once cut from the source  of au-
thority implicit in Swift (the customary understandings of the parties),
the source  of the  authority behind  this common  law  becomes  more
questionable.  The positivist insists that the ultimate source be named;
but the mystery  of conceptualism,  even when tied  to the  inductivism
of Langdell, didn't have  a clear answer.
But as well as a question about the source, what these dissents man-
ifest  is  skepticism  that  judges  are  being  guided by  this  source,
whatever  it  is.  Quibbles  about  the  source  became  battles  about
whether  the source  was  mattering  at  all.  What  seemed  more  and
more  plain  was that judges  were  simply deciding  what  the  common
law  should  be, and  dressing  it up  in  the  pretense  of law  finding." 9
The common  law was becoming more  rationalizing;  but in  becoming
more  rational,  the judgment  within  its  building  was  also  becoming
more plain.
This is the attack of Holmes the realist.  In Holmes's conception, in
the  emerging language of the time, the common law flowed not from
facts found but from choices made.  More  and more  it seemed  both
that federal courts  were  exercising  the power  of state legislatures  (a
federalism  concern  revealed  by positivism),  and  that  federal  courts
were exercising the power of state legislatures  (a separation of powers
117.  Southern  Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,  222 (1917).
118.  Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)  (emphasis added).
119.  See, e.g., Clark, supra note  101, at 1263  (describing later view that judges did
not discover common law, but rather created it).
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concern, revealed by realism).1 20  This meant, under Holmes's view of
what the common law was, that federal courts were exceeding consti-
tutional limits, twice  over.
12 1
This was a contest about what the common law was.  It was in part a
battle over an idea.  The legitimacy of the enterprise hung upon mak-
ing it plausible that courts were externally guided.12'  But by 1937, the
plausibility  of this  idea  had been  drawn  fundamentally  into  doubt.
The discourse of common law finding had become contested, and this
contest had consequences.  What before had seemed plainly permissi-
ble now, Justice Brandeis said in Erie, rested upon  a "fallacy":  "The
fallacy underlying the rule...  is made  clear by Mr. Justice Holmes.
The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is 'a transcendental
body  of law outside  of any particular  State  but obligatory  within  it
unless  and until changed by statute.""'
There was no such body of law.  Said Justice Brandeis, (again echo-
ing Holmes),  "law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does
not exist without some definite authority behind it.""  The language
had changed  ("courts  speak")  in  part perhaps  because  our  view  of
120.  As Dobie concluded:
Did the fathers of this Constitution ever contemplate that the federal courts
should have power to declare the unwritten law of the states in suits touch-
ing merely the private rights of persons when such rights and such suits were
not in any field entrusted to the federal government and in no way involved
the statutes,  treaties,  Constitution,  or even the  powers or activities  of the
United States as such? An emphatic negative.
Dobie, supra note 116, at 238-39.
121.  On the question of constitutionality,  Erie was  decidedly  unclear.  Some  sug-
gested that under Article  M, Congress  had  the power  to specify  rules  of decision,
even where Article I didn't give it substantive power. See Alfred Hill, The Erie Doc-
trine and the Constitution,  53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 427, 439-49 (1958)  [hereinafter Hill, The
Erie Doctrine and the Constitution];  Alfred Hill,  The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66
Harv. L. Rev.  1013 (1953)  [hereinafter Hill,  The Erie  Doctrine in  Bankruptcy]; see
also Akhil  R. Amar, Law Story, 102  Harv. L. Rev. 688,  699 (1989)  (Book  Review)
(addressing  the scope  of judicial  power under  Erie).  But  regardless  of  Congress's
power, Holmes's view stands relative to courts.  Holmes did not, however, think Swift
should be overruled.  Stare decisis, in his view, compelled retaining it, but limiting its
reach.
122.  I am glossing over a significant  complication  here.  I am making it sound as if
the common law practice would be perfectly permissible so long as courts were actu-
ally guided by some external authority-that the flaw reversed in Erie was that in fact,
they were not so guided.  But of course  it matters  what that external authority was.
The practice in Swift, within the domain of private law, is unproblematic  both because
it plausibly  did form the basis of a custom that could guide the court, and because it
was within a domain  where private law making was  untroubling.  But if the domain
were not one where private law making was appropriate  (say, industrial codes under
the NIRA), or if the source was somehow improper (imagine if the courts decided to
follow the common law of England), then the source itself may raise questions, even if
the common law courts were plausibly still guided.
123.  304 U.S.  64, 79  (1938)  (emphasis  added) (footnote  omitted).
124.  Id. (quoting Justice Holmes)  (emphasis added).
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reality  had  changed,125  and  in  part  because  our  view  of  law  had
changed.  Whatever the view before, today law is not conceived except
as the expression  of a political  will.  Thus, to say, as the court of ap-
peals reversed by the Court in Erie had suggested, that federal courts
were "free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the com-
mon law of the State is,"'2 6 was to say that federal courts could exer-
cise an independent judgment about what the law  "should  be.' 27  It
was  no longer  plausible  to believe  that the practice  the  courts  had
developed was actually guiding  or determining  how the common law
would develop.  Evolving  a federal general common law was as much
law making as was the law making of state legislatures.  If this is what
the  Swift  doctrine  meant, then  the  Erie Court  held,  it  had  to  be
rejected.
We should pause  to remark about the extraordinary  nature  of this
change,  for  its  nature  is  central  to  all  that  follows:  Premised  on  a
change in philosophy, and upon its effect on a legal culture, the Court
declared a practice with at least a ninety-six year pedigree unconstitu-
tional.'18  A way of speaking, and therefore,  a way  of understanding,
and therefore, law itself,129 had changed, not through the deliberation
of anyone, not through the democratic  ratification of any legal body,
but through a transformation  in legal  discourse.  One  discourse died,
125.  It is useless  to digress into philosophy  here.  Of course our view of reality is
itself language contingent.  So when I say it depends on our view  of reality, that just
means  it depends  on how we  are speaking in some other domain  of our discourse.
The domains have cross-border implications.  One such implication is that we cannot
anymore ignore that finding is making, and hence that federal judges were now acting
as state legislators.
126.  Erie, 304 U.S.  at 71.
127.  Id
128.  The same point about Erie was made by Hill, The Erie Doctrine  and the Con-
stitution, supra note 121,  at 443-44; Hill, The Erie Doctrine  in Bankruptcy, supra note
121,  at  1032,  1050;  Edward  S. Stimson,  Swift  v.  Tyson-What Remains?  What  is
(State) Law?, 24  Cornell  L.Q. 54, 65  (1938);  Bridwell & Whitten, supra note  100,  at
130); see also Casto, supra note 99, at 955-56  (discussing the different approaches  of
federal courts in Erie and Swift).  As Akhil Amar describes  the change:
The Erie Court's answer to this question  can  also be seen as influenced  by
legal realism.  If common  law decisions  penned by state judges represented
state policy just as much as statutes written by state legislators, then it made
little sense for federal judges to defer to the latter, but not the former.
Amar, supra note 121,  at 695.  Amar points to Hart's similar view. Id.; see also Larry
Kramer, The Lawmaking Power  of the Federal Courts,  12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 283 (1992)
("This  follows from the way in which Holmes and his realist successors changed  our
understanding  of common  law judging.  We have  come  to see  that even the funda-
mental principles of the common law were 'made' by judges.").  For skepticism about
the genuineness of this change, see Freyer, supra note 114, at 2-3.
129.  As stated by Gray, in expressing his concern over the structure of the Harvard
Law School:
"But now I want to say the profession is right."  Gray told Eliot that law was
not at all like the natural sciences  whose "truths and the best means  of ap-
plying them are independent  of opinion."  Law was quite different because
"in law the opinions of judges and lawyers as to what the law is are the law."
LaPiana, supra note 105,  at 19.
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another replaced  it, and it is from  this change  of discourse that Erie
gets its sanction.  Common law law making now appeared  differently
from what it had appeared to be before,  a  difference  in  appearance
that  derives from  a change  in  a  background,  taken-for-granted  dis-
course about what the common law was. 30
The change in this background is not that realism  or positivism be-
came uncontestedly dominant.  Holmes and Brandeis cannot be taken
to be reporting what everyone believed was true.  Formalists and anti-
realists  abounded,  but  none  of that  matters.  Instead,  the  relevant
change is a change from a background contested discourse, to a fore-
ground contested discourse.  This change weakens the continued prac-
tice  of  federal  common  law  law  making-not  because  of  the
ascendancy  of  uncontested  and  emerging  doctrines,  but  rather  be-
cause  of the effect  the contestation  has  on  an  earlier practice.  The
illegitimacy does not depend upon it being plain that courts are simply
making it up.  The illegitimacy  depends upon  there being a  question
about whether courts are making it up-depends, that is,  upon it not
being plain that courts are not making it up.' 3'
That  question,  in  the  face  of  the  competing  claims  of the  state,
forces the reallocation of authority that Erie effects.  Once the skepti-
130.  How did the discourse in law change?  There are two accounts.  One looks to a
change  in ideas alone.  Here is just one:  the naturalism and universalism  inherent in
Justice Story's conception  soon gets drawn into doubt by two fundamentally different
schools  of thought-positivism  on the  one hand, see Freyer, supra note 114,  at 95-96
(describing schools of thought), and the common  law as custom school on the other.
James  C.  Carter, Law:  Its  Origin  Growth  and  Function  120  (1907);  Benjamin  R.
Twiss,  Lawyers and the Constitution:  How Laissez-Faire Came to the Supreme Court
181  (1942).  Positivism entailed  that law is just the command  of a sovereign, and a
sovereign is free to command  as he wishes; it followed under this account  that com-
mon law judges were simply continuing the sovereign's law making.  Common law as
custom entailed  that the common law was simply the reflection  of common custom of
the time and place; it followed under this account that the expansive notion of a gen-
eral federal common law, applying universal rules to a wide range of conditions, made
very little sense. See Freyer, supra note 114, at 97 (discussing the "historical school").
For Holmes, of course, the theory was the emerging pragmatism of American philoso-
phy. See Thomas  C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,  41  Stan. L  Rev. 787, 789
(1989).
But a history of ideas alone will not suffice as an account of the transformation that
gave us Erie. For what is central to the dynamic that I describe is a change in the legal
culture more  generally,  and this  was,  in  large part, the result  of the emerging  law
school  See LaPiana,  supra note 105, at 70-78; William C. Chase, The American Law
School and the Rise of Administrative Government  18 (1982); William E. Nelson, The
Roots  of  American  Bureaucracy,  1830-1900,  at  145  (1982);  Robert  Stevens,  Law
School  (1983).  Indeed, it was this truth that enraged  the more traditional American
Bar Association in the late nineteenth  century, when law schools began  to turn away
from the scientistic conception of the common law, to a more  realist, and hence  less
"legal"  conception of law. LaPiana, supra note  105, at 138.  All  understood:  Change
the training, and you change the reality.  And once you change the reality of what law
was, much else would change  as well.
131.  For a comparable,  and extremely  convincing,  argument,  see  Heilman, supra
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cism was strong enough, once the contest had been sufficiently estab-
lished,  the  Court  was  pressed  to  reallocate  the  authority  before
exercised  by federal  courts. 32  Henceforth,  federal courts  would  be
properly federal (by following states  in  state  domains)  and properly
courts (by  following  rather  than making  law).  The practice  born  in
Swift was then overturned.
The  pressure  was  the  pressure  of what  I  have  called  illegitimacy
costs.  Contestation  had  rendered  a  practice  within  law  illegitimate,
and the Court reallocated that practice  to avoid this cost.  These two
steps-contestation  raising  illegitimacy  costs,  and  a  reallocation  to
avoid  these costs-constitute a pattern.  Elsewhere I have called this
pattern the Erie-effect,1 33 and have argued that the Erie-effect explains
a wide range of changed readings from our interpretive past.  My aim
here is not to repeat that argument, by replaying those examples.  But
I will summarize two to make clear the pattern.  For in the last section
of this paper, I want to extend the pattern to a different type of case.
Chevron: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural  Resources Defense Coun-
cil" 3  is the Erie-effect applied to reading.  It had long been the duty of
the Court to say what statutes mean, whether administrative law stat-
utes or not.135  Over time, this practice  became more  contestable, as
statutes  became  more extensive  or  complex, and  as  the  constructive
aspect of this interpretive practice became more plain.  Interpretation
seemed  less law finding  than law  making, 36 and this  law making  by
courts  raised  an  illegitimacy  cost.  In  Chevron, the  Court  acknowl-
edged this cost, at least in the context of ambiguous statutes.  And to
avoid it, the Court established a rule that shifted interpretive law mak-
ing with ambiguous  statutes  to the agencies  charged  with  the imple-
mentation  of  those  statutes.  The  stronger  democratic  pedigree  of
those  agencies,  the  Court wrote, justified  their engaging  in  this  law
making practice rather than the Court.
1 3 7
Independent Agencies:  Justice Scalia's  argument against  independ-
ent agencies  is the Erie-effect applied to executive  power.  Independ-
ent agencies were born of a time when it was thought that there could
be  "genuinely  'independent'  regulatory  agencies,  bodies  of impartial
experts whose independence from the President [did] not entail corre-
132.  Stone viewed  the  change  in judicial  philosophy  as  the  only justification  for
finding the holding of Swift unconstitutional.  See Casto, supra note 99, at 928.
133.  See Lessig,  Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 4, at 426.
134.  467 U.S. 837 (1984).  For an excellent account of this now "generally accepted"
view, see John F. Manning,  Constitutional  Structure and  Judicial  Deference to Agency
Interpretation  of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 626  (1996).
135.  Marbury  v. Madison,  5 U.S.  (1 Cranch)  137  (1803).
136.  See Martin  v. Occupational  Safety and Health Review  Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
151  (1991).
137.  I  describe  this argument more fully in Lessig,  Understanding Changed Read-
ings, supra note 4, at 436-38.  For a much more subtle argument of the same form, see
Abner  S.  Greene, Adjudicative Retroactivity in  Administrative Law,  1991  Sup.  Ct.
Rev.  261.
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spondingly  greater  dependence  upon  the  committees  of  Congress"
and when it was thought that "the decisions of such agencies so clearly
involve[d]  scientific  judgment  rather  than  political  choice."'138  But
modem administrative lawyers are skeptical of both views.  Independ-
ent agencies,  as we  understand  them today, are not in  this sense in-
dependent,  and  policy  making  is  not  in  this  sense  scientific.  Both
changes  render problematic the  unaccountability  of these bodies.  It
renders  contestable,  that  is,  their  claim  to  independent  executive
power.  In response to this contestability,  Scalia argues that the Court
should  either read statutes  purporting to insulate  independent  agen-
cies narrowly, or strike them down.  Either move would reallocate this
decision-making  power to make it answerable to a democratically-re-
sponsible  officer-the  President.1 39
Each  of these  examples  has a common form.  In each,  there  is  a
discourse that, within law, becomes contested.  In each, the contest is
about  the source  of  decision  for  some  institutional  actor.  In  each,
when that source no longer appears external, or better, when the cred-
ibility of it being external  becomes contested, this creates, for that in-
stitution, an illegitimacy cost.  This contest renders illegitimate relative
to other institutional  actors the  practice  that before presupposed  this
exogenous  authority.  It induces  a  shift among these institutional ac-
tors, so that the practice is placed with the actor who  least suffers this
illegitimacy  cost.  In  Erie, that  actor  was  the  state  courts;  with  in-
dependent agencies, that actor is the President; in Chevron, that actor
is the administering  agency.  In each,  the receiving institution  is  one
with greater political pedigree than the displaced  institution.  And  in
each, the shift finds its source in a contestation  that renders problem-
atic a practice  within law.  Thus the Erie-effect.
As  I will  argue  below,  the  effect  here  is more  general  than  these
examples suggest.  To hint:  Sometimes the effect will counsel defer-
ence;  sometimes,  activism.  But before  this  more general  argument,
we should pause to reflect again upon the contours of our judicial con-
sciousness  that all this should  reveal.
When I have spoken about "politics"  above, I have relied upon  an
intuition.  That intuition now takes on a definition:  What draws these
cases together as cases where judicial action begins to appear political
is that in each, the source of the authority for judicial action no longer
appears  external.  Something has happened to undermine the credibil-
ity that a court or its equivalent is being guided, rather than guiding.
This feature  of "courts"  is  quite deep  within our tradition.  It is  a
feature we share with other related traditions.  What distinguishes us
from the French, for example, is not any view of principle  about what
138.  Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.  1374,  1398 (D.D.C.)  (per  curiaxn), aff'd
sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
139.  See Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 4, at 433-36.
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a "court"  ought to do; in both traditions,  courts  are to be guided  by
others;  what  distinguishes  us from the French  is the  contexts  within
which we believe a court is being guided or not.  We (the more realist)
are more  skeptical about the source of authority;  they (enjoying  still
what to us seems a late nineteenth century formalism) are able to sus-
tain  the  view that judicial  reasoning  is  constraining.  But  how  con-
straining reasoning is is a detail; the important feature is that in both,
constraining it should be.
D.  Rendering Active:  Equal Protection
In the  examples  of the  Erie-effect so far,  authority  is  reallocated
among governmental  actors.  The question is who, given the emerging
contested discourse  at issue, should best decide a particular issue.  In
some cases, that is an administrative agency; in some cases, the presi-
dent; in  some cases  a  (different) court.
In Erie the answer was state rather than federal courts.  But we can
understand the reallocation in Erie in a second way as well.  For Erie
is  not just  a (separation  of)  powers  case;  it  is  also a  (states')  rights
case.  The pressure on the court came not just from the illegitimacy of
federal  courts making state law, but  also  the  illegitimacy  of federal
courts making state law.
The states' rights argument is commonplace:  Federal power is enu-
merated;  thus  the  federal  government  bears  the burden  of  demon-
strating federal authority before it can act on that authority.  Where,
as  in  Erie, the  grounds  for its  authority  are  sufficiently  weakened,
there is pressure for the authority to then shift back  to the states.
The picture is  of a balance, with state  authority on one side of the
scale, and federal authority on the other.  The scale is not balanced;  a
constitutional thumb is on the states' rights side.  That is the meaning
of enumerated  powers:140  If there is  no federal authority, the states
win.  Where the Constitution does place authority on the federal side,
it outweighs  state authority.  In Erie, a weight  that had been  on the
federal side gets removed, as the grounds for exercising the Swift fed-
eral common  law making are eroded.
I belabor this commonplace  of federal authority to help draw a par-
allel that will be important in what follows.  For the value of the Erie
case  to  the  story  that I  am  telling is  precisely  this  duality,  between
separation  of powers  and  rights.  As  a  rights  case  (albeit,  a  states'
rights  case),  Erie suggests  a pattern  of  activism  that  on the  surface
might  seem  inconsistent  with  the  pattern  of  deference  described
above.
140.  Though  admittedly, this is a modem  understanding.  One could work this de-
fault  one step back,  and ask  first whether there  is any power in  the federal  govern-
ment  to support  a  regulation  at all.  I have  simplified  the step  by assuming  at  the
default  that there  is, given  the expansion  of the scope  of enumerated powers.
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That  pattern  is  this:  A  right  is  a trump.''  It  gives  the  holder  a
certain immunity from governmental  action (at least), unless the gov-
ernment can justify that action with sufficiently strong reasons.  That's
the nature of "states' rights":  Where there is a states'  right, the state
has an immunity from federal interference, unless the federal govern-
ment can provide  a sufficient justification  to invade  that immunity.
As applied to states' rights, this formulation may sound a bit odd.'42
It would have been odd at the founding, since at that time, the concep-
tion of power  allocation was  much more binary-either  a power was
state,  or it was  federal.  But as  the  complexities  of divided  powers
have  grown,  the  Court's treatment  of states'  rights  is  closer  to  this
balance than to any binary.  Regretful  as some may think this to be,
states  have  rights  except  where  there are strong  federal  reasons  for
them not to.
As  applied  to individual  rights,  however,  the formulation  is  much
more familiar.  With "non-preferred"  federal rights-for example, the
right  to liberty  under  the  Due Process  Clause-an  individual  has  a
right to liberty, unless the government can  show a justification  to in-
vade that right.  With economic liberty, the necessary showing is quite
slight.  With the liberty to travel, the necessary showing is quite heavy.
In either case, the point is this:  Regardless of how strong the showing
must be, the mechanics of both state and individual rights is the same.
If the government cannot make a sufficiently strong showing, then the
defaults  are to the liberty or immunity protected  in the right.
It is this structure of defaults that is central to the mechanics of the
Erie-effecL  In the  Erie-effect examples  so far,  contestation  yielded
passivity,  but this passivity flowed from  these institutional defaults:
Under Erie, states have authority  unless the federal government  can
show  countervailing  authority;  when  the  ground  of  that federal  au-
thority became  contested,  the  shift was  back  to  the  states;  with  re-
moval,  the  President has  the  right  to remove,  unless  there  is  some
sustaining constitutional  reason not;  a statute giving an  executive  of-
ficer  a ministerial  task would be a  reason  to circumscribe  the Presi-
dent's power, but when the belief that the act is, in the relevant sense,
ministerial  erodes,  the shift in  authority is  back  to the  President.  In
each  case,  contestation  weakened  the  unless clause-the  exception
from  the default-which  in  turn,  strengthens  the  default.  In  these
cases,  to  strengthen  the  default  is  to  make  the  actor  acting  in  the
breach more passive.
141.  See Ronald Dworkin, Is There a Right to Pornography?, 1 Ox. J.1-  Stud.  177,
211  (1981).
142.  Mark  lbshnet  would  disagree.  See  Mark  Tushnet,  Civil  Rights  and Social
Rights, 25  Loy. L.A. L. Rev.  1207,  1213  (1992).  And so may have the Framers.  See
Rakove, supra note 21,  at 301-04.
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In rights cases, 143 however,  this structure  is flipped.  For here,  the
contestation  affects not the relative position of one institutional actor
versus  another, but rather  the authority  of government  to act at  all.
Here, the presumption is against governmental action, in favor of the
right; contestation weakens not that presumption, but the justification
for invading the  right.  Contestation  here  can strengthen the claim of
the right.44
We  can  summarize  the  point  like  this:  Erie-effect cases  are  cases
where contestation within a certain discourse undermines the author-
ity of an earlier practice  or claim.  In what I will call Erie-effect type I
cases, this contestation forces an institutional reallocation of authority
among  governmental  actors.  Erie-effect type I cases  are  division  of
powers cases.  The contestation produces an illegitimacy cost; that ille-
gitimacy  cost  induces  an  institutional  reallocation.  This reallocation
manifests  itself as  a kind of deference.
Erie-effect type II cases  are different.  Like Erie-effect type I cases,
they get going because  of the contestation  of a given  discourse.  But
these cases get raised in the context of rights, not institutional powers.
In the context  of rights, the  default is  in favor  of the right, unless  a
sufficiently  strong governmental  interest  can  be shown.  Here,  how-
ever, the contestation weakens the countervailing governmental inter-
est.  This weakening, then, works to the benefit of the default position,
which  is  the support  of the right.  This  yields  activism by the  Court.
This activism has a cost; but it is not an illegitimacy cost.  Instead, the
cost  that  Erie-effect type 11 cases  produce  are  legitimacy costs:  The
costs  a court suffers  when it must act against  a strong institution, but
for (what in context appears to be) legitimate, or principled, reasons.
In  this last  section,  I  outline  an  example  of an  Erie-effect type II
case,  or perhaps  set  of  cases,  to complete  the  account  of the  Erie-
effect.  The context of these cases  is the Equal Protection Clause.  The
vitality of this most important  Civil War amendment was  affirmed,  to
a limited  degree, just last term  in two  cases  of extraordinary  impor-
tance-United  States v. Virginia,' 145 and Romer v. Evans.146
The latter case had the most to teach  about the continuing  vitality
of equal protection.  There, for the first  time, the Court recognized  a
143.  This framework works for, at least, some rights.  This analysis does  not work
for all "rights" within the Bill of Rights.  My claim so far is limited to preferred rights,
such as equal  protection, and free speech  rights.
144.  I say "can" because there may be cases where the contestation undermines the
very nature  of the right itself, rather than any justification for its invasion.  I realize of
course that these are hard lines to draw, but I want  to insist for the moment that we
can hold clear the distinction between a right whose application is rendered uncertain,
and a justification  for invading a right that becomes uncertain.  I discuss, in the con-
text of cyberspace, the former in Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace,  supra
note 35.
145.  116  S. Ct. 2264  (1996).
146.  116  S. Ct. 1620  (1996).
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principle  of equality as  applied to the interests  of gays  and lesbians.
The former  tells  us much  about  the  reason  for this now  recognized
principle.
Both cases,  but Romer more  than  Virginia, puzzled,  and  perhaps
disgusted the Court's most conservative justices.  Some think the dis-
gust pure  prejudice.  I don't  believe  it  is  that.  My view  is  that  the
frustration  of the most principled  among these dissenters  comes from
their view  that  these  changes  in  the  reach  of the  Equal  Protection
Clause cannot be changes of fidelity;  that the continuing productivity
of the Equal  Protection  Clause  is  just so  much judicial  lawmaking;
that at some point the transformative power of this clause must come
to an end, and if anywhere, certainly here:  with a class  who has long
been the target of animus and discrimination  by America.
The thought that fidelity would not require these changes-or more
precisely,  the  thought  that  fidelity  would  require  that  there  not  be
these changes-is, in my view, understandable.  It is also, in my view,
mistaken.  The view is  understandable  for the same  reason that one-
step originalism  is understandable.  But as it took little to dislodge the
appeal of that initial thought, it should take relatively little to dislodge
the  appeal of this related thought.
What's needed is a principled account of why fidelity would require
this  ongoing  review;  an  account  that makes  sense  of the  history  of
equal  protection  so  far, and  that makes  it plain why  this history  of
activism is not likely to end, nor should it end for someone committed
to originalism,  or more generally, fidelity.  This is the account I mean
to sketch here.
In his lone dissent in Virginia, Justice Scalia stated the question in a
way  that links directly  with the analysis  that I have  sketched  so far.
As he is the principal, and principled, dissenter that I am considering,
consider what he wrote, introducing his  opinion:
Much  of the Court's opinion  is devoted  to deprecating  the closed-
mindedness of our forebears with regard to women's education and
even  with  regard  to  the treatment  of women  in  areas  that  have
nothing to do with education.  Closed-minded  they were-as every
age  is, including  our own,  with  regard to matters  it cannot guess,
because it simply does not consider them debatable.  The virtue of a
democratic system with a First Amendment is that it readily enables
the people,  over  time,  to  be persuaded  that  what  they  took  for
granted is not so, and to change their laws accordingly.  That system
is  destroyed  if the smug  assurances of each  age  are removed  from
the  democratic  process  and  written  into  the  Constitution.  So  to
counterbalance  the Court's criticism of our ancestors,  let me say a
word in their praise:  they left us free to  change.'47
147.  Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2291-92  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia frames the question just fight.  When the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was  passed, the  framers took  many  things  for granted.  These
things taken for granted-what Scalia calls, "not debatable"-change.
In the terms that I have used, the discourses that constitute them be-
come contested.  Sometimes  these contested  questions become again
uncontested, and sometimes  uncontested  in just the  opposite  way as
before.  The not  "debatable"  change,  both  by  becoming  debatable,
and by becoming not debatable in a very different way.  The question
that Scalia rightly poses is this:  What does fidelity require, when what
they presupposed  is no longer presupposed by us?
This, I believe,  is the central question for fidelity theory, but a ques-
tion for which we haven't yet a good answer.  We might imagine three
sorts  of  responses.  The  first  is  the  extreme  one-step  originalist  re-
sponse.  For the one-step  originalist, the question is:  What would the
Framers  have  thought?  To  understand  that,  one  must  presuppose
what they presupposed.  So the fact that we consider just nuts the stuff
that they considered not even debatable  is not, for the one-step, rele-
vant.  The question is what they think, not what we think.  They, after
all, were  the Framers.
This one-step originalist response  is not Scalia's.  He does not argue
that we should decide these questions as if we had the presuppositions
of  the  Framers.  But  neither  does  he  argue  for  the  opposite  re-
sponse-the translator, or two-step response.  His response is between
the one-step, and two-step.  To see its place, consider the two-step, or
translator's,  response first.
The translator reads what the Framers did, understanding it relative
to that framing context; she then locates in this context the equivalent
to their deeds there.  So about the question of sex discrimination, the
translator  might  argue  (in  a  very  crude  form):  The framers  of  the
Fourteenth  Amendment  plainly  thought that race  should not matter
to  one's  civil  rights.  But  about  sex,  they  had  a  different  view.  In
Scalia's  terms, they didn't even think it "debatable"  whether sex dis-
crimination was justified.148  Indeed, for many, the  discriminations  of
the time would not have appeared  as "discriminations,"  just as for us,
the discriminations  in the minimum  driving age don't appear to us as
"discrimination"  against  children.
But we, the translator would argue, have a different view.  It is not
just the case that for us that the matter of sex discrimination is debata-
ble; if it were  debatable, then perhaps there may be good reason for
judicial deference.  For us the matter is no longer debatable.  Or bet-
ter, it is as undebatable  for us that sex discrimination  is a violation of
equality as it was for the framers  of the Fourteenth Amendment that
148.  The best evidence  of this  might be words  of one of the most  radical  of the
Republican  proponents  of the amendment:  Sumner, when  asked about sex discrimi-
nation, said he genuinely didn't know how the amendment would relate to discrimina-
tions  of sex.  No  doubt the balance of the Senators had a fairly clear  view.
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racial  discrimination  was  a violation  of equality.  No doubt  what sex
discrimination  is, or how it applies  in a particular  case,  is debatable.
But that's the same with racial discrimination.  Fray at the border does
not of necessity undo the cloth.
The translator might then argue that because it is not debatable that
sex discrimination is a violation of equality, we should read the Four-
teenth Amendment to apply to sex just as we have read it to apply to
race.
Scalia's  view  is  in-between  these  two.  He  rejects  the  one-step
originalist view in principle  (though in effect  the result might  be the
same):  We are  not  tied  to what  they  considered  undebatable.  But
neither does he embrace the translator's view, which would update the
amendment to reflect (at a  minimum)  what we now  treat as  non-de-
batable.  His position is more agnostic:  Those issues that the Framers
took for granted but which now are debatable  or non-debatable  in a
different way 49 are matters  to which the Constitution does not speak.
They are left to democratic politics.  Any attempt now to constitution-
alize them, by recognizing  today a  new set of undebatable  beliefs,  is
illegitimate:  Fundamentally,  Scalia charges,  "illiberal."
This  is  an  entirely  plausible  view  about  constitutional  fidelity  in
principle.1 50  One  might  have  strong  grounds  with  this  particular
amendment to question (on originalist grounds) its application.151 But
in my view, we needn't resolve this abstract question  about constitu-
tional fidelity in general, or about the original intent of framers of the
Equal Protection Clause in particular, in order to understand the con-
tinued vitality of equal protection jurisprudence.  Virginia and Romer
are understandable with far less of a showing.
The key is  the Erie-effect-more precisely, Erie-effect type 17.  For
what this abstract debate about equality forgets  is the presumption-
the "trump"-of a  rights  claim  (or at  least,  of  an  equal  protection
rights  claim).  The  burden  for  those  who  would  discriminate  is  to
demonstrate  a sufficiently strong reason for that discrimination.  They
must offer, that is,  a justification for this discrimination.  But in offer-
ing  a justification,  the  "undebatable"  is  critical.  If  the justification
rests on what people think is undebatable, the justification is relatively
149.  This is a distinction that Scalia doesn't make, but which I think is critical. See
Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability: Responses to Responding to Imperfection,
74 Tex. L. Rev. 839, 863-71  (1996).
150.  See, e.g., id. (comparing different positions on constitutional evolution through
judicial construction).
151.  That is,  one  could  well  question  this position  on  originalist  grounds.  One
could well argue, that is,  that the framers of this amendment spoke in the terms that
they spoke  precisely  because  they  didn't want  to  tie  the  amendment  down  to  the
particular  level of closed-mindedness  that they knew  they suffered.  On  this under-
standing, the amendment is a constitutional commitment to open-mindedness,  mean-
ing whenever society comes to see that its  old way of thinking was "closed-minded,"
the task of the enforcers of this amendment  is to open minds up.
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strong.  If the justification rests on what people think is debatable,  or
contested in my terms, then the justification  is relatively weak.  Thus,
if the justification  for a  discrimination  rests upon what the Framers
thought non-debatable,  then  when that undebatable becomes debata-
ble, so too does the justification. When the undebatable  changes,  it
weakens the justification  for the discrimination. Contestation is in this
sense transitive;  it weakens what its absence  supported.
At some  point this  contestation  matters.  At some  point, as  these
justifications  become  weaker,  the  Erie-effect kicks  in.  As  in  rights
cases perhaps generally,  and as in Erie in particular, the contestation
of a justification  for invading  a right yields  a more active  defense  of
that right.  Contestation  tilts to the default, and the  default  is active
support of the right.
This is, I want to argue, the pattern in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Or better, it is a history that can be understood in light
of this pattern.  In the balance  of this  section, I want to sketch that
history, and suggest how it fits within that pattern.
For one schooled in the jurisprudence of equal protection law, what
follows will  seem a bit strange.  I have not attempted  to fit the story
that follows into the regime of modern equal protection law.  I instead
want to describe the history at a more general  level, and this for two
reasons.  First, the categories  of modern equal protection doctrine are
drawn in such  a way that  any change  seems suspect-presumptively
the judges  making it up.  The  categories  of strict, intermediate,  and
rational basis review have  carved  up the universe  of discriminations;
any  "additions"  are made to seem amendatory,  as if the court would
be adding to the protections  that the Equal Protection  Clause  origi-
nally gave.  Casebook authors write things like "it is unlikely that the
present Court will add new classifying traits to the list of suspect and
quasi-suspect  classifications,"' 5 2 and this is no doubt correct.  But one
wants to  ask why  no other  groups will be  added  to the  heightened
scrutiny list:  Is this because equality has been achieved?  Groups were
added in the past 100 years; what reason  is  there to believe that the
demands  of the  Equal  Protection  Clause won't  find  their  attention
again  on  other  groups,  not  yet  recognized?  Additions  are  always
presented as more protection; but as I harped on at the start, additions
may also be necessary to give the same protection, given what we now
see  to be discrimination.
The second reason I want  to avoid the categories of modern  equal
protection law is that these formal categories  don't give us a sense  of
what this equality is about.  This is the clear message of Koppleman's
recent work, 53 and its prominence promises a time when we will have
much to rethink.  My aim in what follows is to describe a  theory at a
152.  Jerome A. Barron  & C. Thomas Dienes,  Constitutional Law 249 (1991).
153.  Andrew  Koppelman,  Antidiscrimination  Law and Social Equality  (1996).
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very low  level  of theory;  to make sense  of  a process  of change  that
generalizes  in an understandable,  and justifiable way;  and possibly to
describe  a process that points to how we should go on.
One final word of qualification:  In what follows I will speak  of the
Equal Protection  Clause.  This  is  my  one  concession  to the  modem
understanding,  but I concede  this  only  for ease  of exposition.  The
understanding that I sketch below  I draw from  what I  believe  is the
full motivation of the Fourteenth  Amendment,154 not any one clause.
Indeed, as John Harrison has recently made plain, 55  we have lost an
extraordinary  amount of that tradition by reading out of the amend-
ment perhaps  its most important clause-the Privileges and Immuni-
ties  Clause.  My  reading  of  the  amendment  draws  heavily  on  the
understanding  of equality he sketches.' 6
One way to tell the history of equal protection is to describe it as a
gradual "expansion"  of the scope of groups covered by the highly un-
derspecified  promise of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This is the mod-
em story; it begs the question, by what right does the court "expand"
the scope of the amendment?
The story I want to tell is  different.  It acknowledges  new  protec-
tions; but it  emphasizes  a part too often missed:  That these protec-
tions were in response to new discriminations; or better, in response to
"discriminations"  that came to be seen as discriminations.  These are
new protections in response to a new threat, or better, to a threat now
seen to be a threat.  The model for this is the understanding of Judge
Bork, who, of the First Amendment said:
There is not at issue here the question of creating new constitutional
rights  or principles  ....  When  there  is  a  known  principle to  be
explicated  the  evolution  of  doctrine  is  inevitable.  Judges  given
stewardship  of a constitutional provision-such  as the  first amend-
ment-whose  core  is  known but whose outer reach  and  contours
are ill-defined, face the never-ending task of discerning the meaning
of the provision from one case to the next....  In a case like this, it
is the task of the judge in this generation  to discern  how the fram-
ers' values, defined  in the context of the world they knew,  apply to
the world we know.  The world changes in which unchanging values
find their application....  Perhaps the framers did not envision libel
actions as a major threat to that freedom.  I may grant that, for the
sake of the point  to be made.  But if, over  time, the  libel  action
154.  Well, not Section 2.
155.  John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges  or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L
J. 1385  (1992); see also Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts 140-43  (1994)
(arguing for a broad use of the Privileges and Immunities Clause under an originalist
approach);  Michael W. McConnell,  Originalism  and the Desegregation  Decisions, 81
Va. L. Rev. 947,  957-62  (1995)  (discussing debate  over interpretation  of Fourteenth
Amendment and the Privileges  and Immunities  Clause).
156.  I don't agree with Harrison that the best way to understand  the scope of fun-
damental rights is to track Lockean theory.  But for the purposes of this essay, that is
a quibble.
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becomes  a  threat  to  the central  meaning  of the  first  amendment,
why should not judges adapt their doctrines?  Why is it different to
refine  and  evolve  doctrine  here,  so  long  as one is  faithful  to  the
basic  meaning  of the  amendment,  than  it  is  to  adapt  the  fourth
amendment  to  take  account  of  electronic  surveillance,  the  com-
merce  clause  to  adjust  to  interstate  motor  carriage,  or  the  first
amendment  to  encompass  the  electronic media?  I do not believe
there  is a difference. 7
In  that  context,  the  changing  threats  of  libel  actions justified,  Bork
argued,  "new  protections"  against  libel  actions.  And  so  too in  the
context of equal protection:  Following Bork, the question  we should
ask is whether the changes  in equal protection jurisprudence  are just
responses  to what  is now seen  as new threats.  For then, just as with
the First Amendment, the "additional"  protections would just be "the
same"  protections  in a new context.
5 8
That would be equal protection law's claim to interpretive  fidelity.
The Constitution applies as we see the world to which we are applying
it.  The question  for constitutional theory is  to understand something
more about how this seeing changes.  That, for equal protection, is the
story I want now to tell.
The ideals of the Civil War notwithstanding, it is commonplace that
the reality of America for the balance  of the nineteenth century was
deeply racist.  But  "racist"  doesn't capture  exactly  the reality.  "Ra-
cism" for us159 seems a choice; a bad choice, an evil choice, a choice to
157.  Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 471  U.S. 1127  (1985).
158.  In what sense, though, are these threats "new."  In what sense are these  "dis-
criminations"  something that come to exist, but before were not?  If the treatment of
homosexuals  is now seen to be discrimination,  does my position mean that before  it
was not?
Yes,  and no. The story I am telling is white-boy's history.  It is a story about how a
dominant  class came  to include  others  within  its  protections.  In  the  middle  of the
nineteenth  century, this dominant  class announced  to the world that it was  going to
respect a principle of "equality."  And, in the story I am telling, over time it came  to
see how things it was  doing  were "discriminations."  From the white-boy's perspec-
tive, the discrimination begins with the recognition.  The contest about remedy starts
thereafter.
But of course, from the perspective of everyone else, one can say the discrimination
has always existed.  It has always existed, whether recognized  by the perpetrator, or
victim,  or  not.  Homosexuals  were  discriminated  against  in  1920,  even  if everyone
who  did  that  discrimination  did it  for what  they  perceived  to  be  the most  benign
reasons possible.
I tell the story from the perspective  of white-boy's  history, because how else does
one expect constitutional law to have developed?  This is winner's history, and we  (or
I) can do no more than tell it from the self-satisfied, morally certain, perpetually  virtu-
ous, god-chosen perspective that is the perspective of those who have articulated con-
stitutional law.  Of course,  we should  read that description  both with, and without,
scare quotes;  but it is lived always with the scare quotes left at home.
159.  In moods  most pessimistic, at least.  What conservatives  call political correct-
ness might be an indication that in fact, racism  is no more a choice.  But I leave  that
aside.
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be  scorned, but nonetheless,  a choice that society leaves  open to its
citizens.  It is one among a number of such choices left open to indi-
viduals within a society.
For the intellectual  elite of the late nineteenth  century, however, it
wasn't such a choice.  Racism wasn't "political"  in the sense of an op-
tional feature of the world.  Racism was instead a feature of reality.  It
wasn't something one chose to believe or not; it was how things were.
Racism  constituted how  people saw the world-how normal  people
saw the world.  To  deny or question  racism didn't make you curious,
or clever.  To deny it made you weird.
The reason this vileness was so powerful was not mere "politics."  It
was  not just because  a  bunch  of powerful  politicians  succeeded  in
stopping Reconstruction.  I want to argue that racism had this irresisti-
ble  influence  because  the  views  or judgments  of  racism were  so  di-
versely  supported.  There  was,  to misuse  John  Rawls's  heuristic,  an
overlapping  consensus  about views on  race.  Not just  within politics,
but within biology, and social science, and anthropology, and psychol-
ogy-views about the appropriateness of (what one would see as) the
inequality perpetrated by law were dominant.16°  There was a natural-
ness to this  inequality;  a naturalness  supported  by these diverse  dis-
courses,  and  there  was  an  appropriateness  to  supporting  this
naturalness.  Views  here  were  relatively  uncontested,  because  they
were  so  overwhelmingly  supported,  where  overwhelmingly  simply
means supported from so many perspectives.
It was this overlapping  consensus  that made a  case  like Plessy al-
most easy.161  Of course-then-a regulation that supported the sepa-
ration of the races was "reasonable."  Segregation  was at the core of
that society; its sensibility was supported from any number of perspec-
tives;  how could  support for  the norm be  unreasonable?  The  obvi-
160.  See, eg., Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism 2-3  (1992)  (anthro-
pology); id.  at 2 ("At the beginning of the twentieth century, the term 'race'  had a far
wider meaning  than  at present, being  used to  refer  to  any  geographical,  religious,
class-based  or color-based  grouping.  Although  sanctioned  by science,  its  scientific
usage was multiple, ambiguous and at times self-contradictory.");  John S. Hailer, Jr.,
Outcasts from Evolution  Scientific Attitudes of Racial Inferiority,  1859-1900, at ix-xi
(1971)  ("Most of the environmentalists  were not outspoken racists.  As leading physi-
cians, anthropologists, educators, paleontologists, and sociologists,  their views on race
inferiority, at once assumed and 'proven'  within the context of their framework, were
not the primary  subject of their concern but, rather, were  elements  which  partially
formed the foundation of their larger intellectualizations.");  Nancy Stepan, The Idea
of Race in Science:  Great Britain 1800-1960,  at ix  (1982)  ("That  is to say,  the lan-
guage, concepts, methods and authority of science were used to support the belief that
certain  human  groups were  intrinsically inferior to others, as measured by some so-
cially defined criterion, such  as intelligence  or 'civilised'  behaviour.  A 'scientific  ra-
cism' had come into existence  that was to endure  until well after the Second World
War.")
161.  And which would  have made  it much more  difficult in 1868. See McConnell,
supra note 155,  at 954.
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ousness  of the  conclusion  hid  the plain inconsistency  in  the rhetoric
supporting it.
Of course to say that there was this overlapping consensus of views
then is not to say that there were no dissidents.  Indeed, Plessy gives
us one of constitutional law's most famous dissents.  But as Leon Hig-
genbotham has quite eloquently reminded us, it is not an accident that
the man who could write that dissent graduated not from Harvard or
Yale  law  school,  but instead  from  Transylvania  Law  School.162  As
Higgenbotham teaches, it is the odd man in an evil world who find the
good.
Over time, of course, the dissidents in these discourses  about race
had  an  effect.  In  different  areas,  their  questions,  and  challenges,
eroded  this  consensus.  This  erosion  was  felt  first  within  science,
where the principles of scientific racism were effectively  challenged.163
Indeed, for the  racists, enlisting  science  on  their side was  a bargain
with  the  devil,  for  as  science  regurgitated  its  earlier  conclusions,  it
soon  abandoned  the  racist  positions it  supported.  As  science  soon
challenged  racism,  and  as  other  areas of racism  were  challenged  as
well,  the layers of this overlapping  consensus began  to thin.  One by
one, areas where science proved the inferiority of the black race were
areas where this proof was drawn into doubt.  The old views were re-
jected, or at least  contested.  Slowly, the  natural  of before  now be-
came simple prejudice.
The effect of this destabilization on racism in law, of course, was not
immediate.  Nor was it necessarily  determinative.  But  the  contesta-
tion did make Brown v. Board of Education 1"  all the more likely.  As
the grounds  outside of law for justifying racism disappeared,  pressure
fell to the  grounds  within law to sustain the earlier practices  of ine-
quality.  To sustain the inequality of the late nineteenth century with-
out the undebatables of the late nineteenth century became more and
more  difficult.  The only  support  was precedent,  and this,  however,
proved to be a very weak support.  Contestation,  or rejection of these
views  outside of law rendered it more and more  difficult, within law,
to sustain the same views.
The flip in race is the best known.  Brown confronted, and resolved
it.  In  a wide range  of areas, at  a minimum, the justifications  for the
discrimination  against  blacks had been either contested,  or rejected;
scientific racism had been displaced, by the one-two punch  of science
and Hitler:  science didn't support it, and our defeat of Hitler's racism
while  maintaining  segregated  schools  threw  hypocrisy  into  the  bar-
gain.  So when the Court finally faced the question whether the legally
supported segregation  of Plessy could, consistent with the Equal Pro-
162.  A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas  from a
Federal  Judicial Colleague, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev.  1005,  1009  (1992).
163.  See Barkan, supra note 160, at 10-11,  19,  119.
164.  347  U.S. 483  (1954).
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tection Clause, be sustained, it found all the support for such a conclu-
sion had vanished.  It was not obvious to all, it was not commended by
science, it was not consistent with the best of who America said it was:
All that supported it was a remote and opportunistic doctrine of stare
decisis, tied to the bare claim that the police power has always permit-
ted states to order social spheres according  to their perception of mo-
rality, tied to deeply  held views  of a  democratic majority.  But these
justifications were just too thin.  However controversial, the command
of the Equal Protection Clause demanded  an answer.
The flip occurs  in Brown, and Brown marks a pattern that I want to
suggest  recurs  throughout  equal protection  law.  Put  abstractly,  the
pattern is this:  Law  is  shot through  with  discriminations-with  dis-
tinctions  that formally,  at least,  seem  equivalent,  but  which  doctri-
nally, are treated fundamentally differently.  These discriminations are
for the most part unnoticed.  We don't see them as discriminations, for
the world they cut up seems to us as natural.  For example,  we could
"discriminate"  in  the  admission  of  students  to  law  school  in  any
number of ways.  We could:  (1) select students based on race, (2) se-
lect  students based  upon their ability on some  standardized  test, (3)
select students  based  on the  communities they are  likely to serve  as
lawyers,  or (4)  select  students based  upon  whether their parents  at-
tended  the  same  school.  Formally,  these  are  all  "discriminations."
But substantively, we are likely  only to see  two  of the four as  "dis-
criminations."  (Numbers 1 and 3).165  Why we see these as  "discrimi-
nations" ties, I am arguing, to something about how we see the world,
and how  we see  the world  is  tied  to the  range, or thickness,  of the
"overlapping  consensus"  supporting  that way  of viewing  the  world.
The thicker it is, or the more sustained, the less likely it is that we will
see a "discrimination"  as  a "discrimination."
Or again:  We punish overweight people in all sorts of ways.  These
punishments take the form of discriminations-erotic discriminations,
social  discriminations,  political  discriminations,  civil  discriminations.
Few now see these discriminations  as  "discriminations."  Instead, the
opportunities we deny the overweight seem naturally denied to them.
We speak of how awful it is for them to be overweight, and then say
that if they feel awful,  it is "solely because the[y]  ...  choose[ ]  to put
that construction upon it."'"  They could do otherwise, we rationalize.
Their burden is self-imposed.
My argument  is that we can understand  why these discriminations
can exist without being seen as "discriminations"  with a heuristic of an
overlapping consensus.  Again, it is where the formal  "discrimination"
seems supported  by  a  large number  of  perspectives  that  we  simply
don't see it as  discrimination.  It only appears  as discrimination when
165.  Hopwood v. Texas,  78  F.3d 932  (5th Cir.),  cerL  denied, 116  S.  Ct. 2580, and
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
166.  See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.  537, 551  (1896).
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the range of perspectives from which it is supported narrows, or weak-
ens.  Thus  in the law school  example,  ideas  about  how intellectually
difficult  law is  (the  origin of this idea is  a mystery),  and general no-
tions  of individualized  effort and merit combine  to make it  obvious
that grades should determine admission; with the overweight, notions
about self-control, or health, or self-respect, bolster us in our discrimi-
nation.  In both cases, these supporting discourses are quite weak, yet
they  are  pervasive  and  general,  and  they  combine  to  support  ex-
traordinary suffering.
Even lawyers know enough history to know that over time, in some
cases, the thickness  of this consensus narrows.  This narrowing occurs
as  discourses  that  were  before  relatively  uncontested  become  con-
tested.  Or more precisely, it occurs when, from the perspective of law,
these discourses  appear contested.  Within law, this  contestation ren-
ders a judgment resting upon this  discrimination  more troubling.  It
increases,  again, the burden on a court that is called upon to continue
to support a discrimination.  And at some point, the burden forces the
court to flip; to find as  "discriminatory"  what  before could not  have
even been seen  as  discrimination.
My argument  then is that what is seen as  "discrimination"  depends
upon  a background  discourse which law doesn't directly control; that
as  this  discourse  changes,  the justifications  for these now recognized
discriminations  will change;  and that as the strength of these justifica-
tions change, things that before seemed justified even  if unequal  will
now seem unjustified  because unequal.
To say this is not to say, however, that at any time, things that can
be seen as  "discrimination"  can be made the subject of equal protec-
tion's protection.  This is emphatically not my argument.  Social mean-
ings limit equal protection, and the limits of social meanings are real.
Discriminations  based  on  race  are  "discriminations"  meet  for  the
Equal  Protection  Clause;  discriminations  based  on  sex  as  well;  dis-
criminations  based  on  illegitimacy  as  well;  discriminations  based  on
sexual orientation perhaps  as well.  But discriminations based  on "at-
tractiveness"  are not-even though the "status" that the attractiveness
game plays constructs all sorts  of social inequality.  There is no differ-
ence in principle  (though certainly  in degree) between  the inequality
imposed  on the "ugly"  in  this society, and the gay in  a homophobic
society:  Both are denied social life on the basis of a stigma created by
social meanings  that society constructs.' 67
Race is just the first example of the pattern I am suggesting.  Illegit-
imacy is a second.  The justifications for discrimination against illegiti-
mate  children  were narrower  than  the justification  for race; but the
pattern of its removal is similar nonetheless.  Historically it was tied to
three justifications:  First, the support  of English  property structures
167.  See supra note 83  (describing MacKinnon's  definition  of inequality).
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that needed to control quite carefully lines of descent; second, the sup-
port of sexual  mores, which  strongly  opposed  extramarital  sex;  and
third, the avoidance  of a welfare burden on the state, imposed by Me-
gitimate children.  In England, these three justifications supported the
(western) world's harshest penalties  against the illegitimate.16
When the English law was carried over to America, the strength of
these justifications weakened.  First, there was not the same interest in
protecting lines  of descent  as in England;  estates were more  egalita-
rian, citizens freer to alienate.  Second, there was not (at least initially)
the  same  passion  for  controlling  sexual  mores.  Americans,  at  the
founding at least, were, relative to the English,  less puritanical.  What
remained was the welfare interest which  did continue to create an in-
terest in regulating illegitimacy,  but which, standing alone, didn't sup-
port the very strong stigma that illegitimacy  law seemed to support.
From the perspective of equal protection, however, the shifts in ille-
gitimacy come much later-1968 is the first year.  There, in an extraor-
dinarily  sloppy  opinion  by Justice Douglas,  the court  rejected  these
justifications  as  insufficient  for  continuing  certain  discriminations
against illegitimates.1
69
Since 1968, perhaps in part because of the paucity  of justification in
that  case,  the  equal  protection  history  of  protecting  illegitimates  is
much  less clear.  But we needn't excavate the  details  to see  the pat-
tern.  In 1968, of the three justifications that might have overlapped to
make  it plain why  illegitimates  should  be treated  as  they were,  one
(the  property  justification)  had  been  plainly  undermined;  a  second
(the  welfare  justification)  didn't  on  the  margin  appear  especially
pressing; and the third (sexual mores) were at the time fundamentally
contested.  What Douglas  no  doubt felt, though  had no  way  to say,
was that the justification for treating these  children  as tradition  had
treated them was simply gone.
Gender  discrimination  follows  a  similar  path  even  more  plainly.
Much of the naturalness of the rules, both legal  and social, that kept
women in the home came from a set of relatively stable views about
an "appropriate"  family, and  family life.  In the late nineteenth  cen-
tury, they were stable enough for the Supreme Court to point to them
quite directly:
[T]he  civil  law,  as  well  as nature  herself, has always  recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres  and destinies of man  and
woman.  Man  is, or  should  be,  woman's  protector  and  defender.
The natural and  proper timidity and  delicacy  which belongs  to the
female  sex evidently  unfits  it for many  of the occupations  of civil
life.
170
168.  See the discussion in Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth:  Law and the
Family in Nineteenth  Century America  ch. 6 (1985).
169.  The  case was  Levy v. Louisiana,  391 U.S. 68  (1968).
170.  Bradwell v.  State, 83 U.S. (16  Wall.)  130, 141  (1872).
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Even in the middle  of this century, the same views were  quite sta-
ble.  As the Chief Justice recently wrote,  "well into this century, legal
distinctions between men and women were thought to raise no ques-
tion under the Equal Protection  Clause."''  In 1961,  for example, in
upholding  a  differential jury list system, the  court observed  that the "woman  is still regarded  as  the center of home and family  life."'72
In a sense, the overlapping consensus about sex was both more per-
vasive,  and more unstable.  Its  pervasiveness  was cultural  as  well  as
scientific-if there is  a distinction to be drawn there.  But as women
entered the work force, and as marriage became more companionate,
the  ideological  premises  of  this  old  structure  were  questioned.  Its
"truth"  was  quite  quickly  challenged.  As  women  entered  the
workforce, traditional views  were foregrounded,  and contested.  The
discourse moved from box [4]  to box [1].
This contest removed them from the reliable authorities that a court
could point to when supporting  gender discrimination.  It threw into
question assumptions earlier made about their proper place, and their
proper role.  It forced this arbiter of sexual propriety to identify him-
self-and in the swim of this battle, no one had the legs to claim that
stand.
Once  background discourses  that implicitly supported sex  discrimi-
nation were  destabilized,  or once  at  a minimum  contested,  this  put
great pressure  on the court to recognize  that laws that continued  to
rely  upon  these  principles  of  inequality  violated  the  Fourteenth
Amendment's command.  Because these views were contested, courts
could  see a  discrimination where before  discrimination was invisible.
And quite late  in the game, in an opinion that sparked  little contro-
versy, for the first  time the  Court found a  law that discriminated  on
the  basis  of  sex  unconstitutional  within  the  command  of the  Four-
teenth Amendment.
That case was Reed v. Reed,'73  and the  year 1971.  It took  eleven
years before the Court would again find a statute unconstitutional  on
sex  discrimination  grounds.  But  in  those  years,  the  position  recog-
nized by Reed found broad and continued  support in a wide array of
contexts.  There was a generation of work to work out the implications
of equality,  and it was  a  generation  of contest  with those  who  held
"traditional" views.  But where the tradition was not backed with rea-
son, where the judgment  of the  present  was nothing  more  than  the
fact that the same was said from time immemorial, the power of equal
protection trumped.  The traditional way was  embarrassed,  for what
was undebatable  before was now,  at a minimum, quite  debated.
171.  United  States  v.  Virginia,  116  S.  Ct.  2264,  2288  (1996)  (Rehnquist,  C.J.,
concurring).
172.  Hoyt v. Florida, 368  U.S. 57, 62  (1961).
173.  404 U.S.  71  (1971).
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The same battle now exists in the context of sexual orientation, and
there is little reason not to expect the battle will track the same  pat-
tern as well.  For the battle over sexual orientation is the starkest ex-
ample of the pattern that I am sketching.  There can be no doubt that
sexual orientation will enter the realm of protected  equal protection
classes.  There  can  be no  doubt  that it  will,  but more  importantly,
there can be no doubt that it should,  under a faithful reading  of the
equal protection right.  When, how quickly, with what resolve-these
are questions  of prudence,  and virtue, that  the Court  will no  doubt
confront.  But the conclusion can't be doubted, at least if the pattern I
have outlined tracks  something real.
The pattern here begins in the beginning  of this century.  As I out-
lined when discussing this conception of contested discourses directly,
until the early 1970s, homosexuality  was considered a "disease."' 74  If
anything for us is uncontested, what we do with people with a disease
is that thing:  We "cure" them.  We try to rid them of this disease, and
we feel self-righteous  in our ridding.  So society, in many ways, erects
barriers to the flourishing of the disease; it punishes its manifestation;
it counsels its eradication  (in England, for example, "Alan Turing was
faced with the choice between going to jail and having hormonal treat-
ment."175).  Given the judgment  of pathology, delivered  to us by  sci-
ence, that homosexuality  is abnormal, we  can either reject science or
reject  homosexuals.  None  would  think  long  about  which  society
would do.
The pervasiveness  of this view about homosexuality  should not  be
forgotten.  It was common ground for liberals as well as conservatives.
Said  Justice  Douglas,  of  homosexuality:  "[Homosexuals]  are  the
products 'of heredity, of glandular dysfunction,  [or]  of environmental
circumstances.'...  The homosexual is one, who by some freak, is the
product of an arrested development  ....  ,176  It was, as racism was, as
views  of illegitimacy  were,  as  sexism  was,  "undebatable"  for all,  or
most, within this earlier time, in large part again because supported by
this science.
Science has now rejected this earlier view.  There was a battle about
it;  this  battle  was  plainly  "political";  but  in  the  end,  the  dominant
political  view  (among  doctors)  became  truth.  Henceforth,  this  dis-
crimination,  which  is  everywhere  palpable  in  our society,  draws  no
further justification from science.  It has been cut off from this domi-
174.  See Michel Foucault,  Sexual Discourse and Power, in Jeffrey  C. Alexander &
Steven  Seidman  eds.,  Culture & Society  Contemporary Debates 199,  200-01  (1990);
supra text accompanying  notes 84-93.
175.  Elster, supra  note 52,  at 109; see also Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 208
n.53 (1992) (noting that Turing agreed to undergo female hormone treatment to avoid
imprisonment).
176.  Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S.  118,  127 (1967)  (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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nant source  of authority in  society, and  must find, for its sustenance,
other grounds.
We all know what these "other  grounds"  are.  They are essentially
two:  first, the right to "regulate morality" and second, to a long-stand-
ing "tradition"  against homosexuality in America.  But these justifica-
tions,  if  we  are  faithful  to  our  equal  protection  history,  will  not
survive.  Standing alone they have never been enough to sustain what
comes  to be seen  as  discrimination.  Tradition  alone  is  certainly  not
enough. 77  No theory of equal protection that gave it the trump could
explain equal protection's past, for absolutely every group recognized
under the clause has been the victim of tradition.  "Tradition"  has al-
ways been used as a justification for continuing discrimination  against
a group  claiming equal protection.  Unless we have  a tradition  of ig-
noring tradition until we reach the claims of gays and lesbians, "tradi-
tion"  as  a  reason  should  be  a  non  sequitur  in  equal  protection
arguments.
Nor will the "morality"  argument be enough.  This is the argument
that we have always allowed regulation to advance conceptions of mo-
rality, and homosexuality is strongly against the dominant conception
of morality.
For  though  we  have  indeed  permitted  such  regulation,  we  have
never  permitted  it  (a)  when  it is  against  the  substantial  interests  of
some  group  of citizens,  and  (b)  when  the moral views  are not sup-
ported by  other, overlapping discourses. From  the  start,  in  a  wide
range of cases,  equal protection  has at first been blind  to what  later
would  seem  plain  discriminations,  and  it  has  struggled  to  test  the
strength of the reasons  offered  as justifications in  its support.  Equal
protection is  blind when, to use Justice Scalia's  words, ideas  that no-
body thought "debatable"  made the discrimination seem obvious; but
over  time,  as  these ideas  not thought  "debatable"  became just  that,
the grounds,  and the  strength, of these justifications  eroded.  Slowly,
the discriminations  were  seen  as  "discriminations."  And  eventually,
the range  of perspectives  upon which  discrimination  can  be justified
narrowed to just a few-to the long standing  tradition of discrimina-
tion,  to  the  right  of  a  people  to  regulate  the  morals  of  their
community.
But  what  happens  then?  When  we  make  such  a  comparative  ac-
count, we notice something important.  Morality has been a legitimate
ground, when supported by other, overlapping discourses-it  has not
been  sufficient  when  standing  alone.  Contrary  to the  rhetoric  that
suggests the "long standing tradition" in America supporting the "po-
lice power right to regulate in areas of morals," in fact, again we have
no tradition of allowing such regulation against the direct and substan-
tial liberty interests of citizens when the only justification for such reg-
177.  See Levy v. Louisiana,  391  U.S. 68, 71  (1968).
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ulation  is morality.  When these overlapping grounds separate,  when
all that is  left is  this prejudice,  equal protection  law steps  in.  When
morality stands  alone, the claim of equality outweighs  it.
Morality  stands  alone  not only  when  other support  has  been  re-
jected.  Morality  stands  alone  as  well  even  when  other support  has
been  drawn  into doubt.  Contestation  here,  as  in every  other  equal
protection claim, undermines the justification  for what is now seen to
be  discrimination.  It weakens  the justification  for  state actions  that
yield  discrimination.  And  as  it weakens  these justifications,  we  ob-
serve, in  each  of these  equal protection  contexts,  the  same  effect-
what I have called, an Erie-effect type I.  In each of these contexts, as
the justification for invading a right disappears,  the trump of the right
remains.  This  trump induces  a  certain  activism  by  the court-again,
an activism to support this right in the face of, at best, contest to the
contrary.
This is our tradition in equal protection law.  It has not been a tradi-
tion  that  allows  the  government  to  express  and  enforce  antipathy,
when unsupported  by other neutral  reasons.  It  is  a tradition  of re-
specting "reasons"  even if also supported by antipathy.  When the rea-
sons fall away, or are drawn into contest, the justification is drawn into
doubt, antipathy notwithstanding.  This  is  the insight of Justice  Ken-
nedy's opinion in Romer v.  Evans,178  and this is the genius of its em-
phasis  on  tradition.  Antipathy  alone  has not  been  enough;  and  so,
faithful to that tradition,  the  Court in Romer held, nor should  it be
enough now.
The activism that this contestation induces invites, as I suggested at
the  start, a  certain legitimacy  cost.  The Court  faces  a  claim  by the
government to regulate which it must reject; it rejects it in the name of
a principle well  established in our constitutional tradition, because  of
what the government has not well established.  In so rejecting the gov-
ernment's claim of power, the Court invokes  a picture of itself as re-
sisting arbitrary power in the name of principle.  And in invoking  this
picture,  the Court  acknowledges  the  threat it  faces,  but asserts  the
tradition that supports  it in this act.
An analogy, perhaps  overly lawyerly, may draw the point together.
Constitutional law, we might  say (not literally  but by analogy)  is de-
cided at the  level  of the  summary  judgment  motion.  A  question  is
presented  which,  because  of the structure  of the dispute,  has an  an-
swer by default.  The party resisting the default has a  burden then to
make  a  showing  to the  contrary.  Where  that showing  can  be  made
without  invoking  a  material  dispute,  the  party  resisting  the  default
prevails.  Whether there is a material dispute, however, the question is
resolved as  the default would resolve  it, and the issue is passed  on to
the next stage of the dispute-constitutional  politics.
178.  118 S. Ct.  1620 (1996).
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In  Erie-effect type I cases,  the  default  is democratic.  Power  flows
naturally  to the body with  the  stronger  democratic pedigree.  Struc-
tures to the contrary  (federal common law, agency independence,  in-
terpretive lawmaking)  sustain themselves so long as sufficient grounds
for  the  exception  remain  relatively  uncontested.  Contest  in  those
grounds  shifts authority back  to democrats.
In Erie-effect type 1I cases, the default is non-democratic, and rights
based.  Power  flows  naturally to the  rights claim.  Arguments  to the
contrary  (supporting  structures that now appear to discriminate)  sus-
tain  themselves  so  long as  sufficient grounds  for this justification  re-
main uncontested.  Contest in those  grounds shifts  authority back to
the right  as trump.
E.  What the Erie-Effect  Explains
Most of the time, most of what we know is  stuff in box [3]  of the
matrix above.  Most  of the social world  is  background,  uncontested.
We don't notice it (that's the implication of it'being background);  we
can't easily quantify it.  But it is that stuff that constitutes how we see
the world around us, and how we see the world has been made.
What is in box [3]  moves; stuff moves out of box [3]  into contested,
and  then openly contested  terrain.  Other stuff moves  into  box  [3],
after long  contest,  and then  long resolve.  This  shifting  of discourse
background to a present consciousness  is extraordinary difficult to no-
tice let alone track;  nonetheless,  it is a  shifting that matters to prac-
tices  of interpretive  fidelity.  The content,  and change of this box  [3]
affects the content, and change, of constitutional  law.
My  argument  in this  part might  be summarized  like this:  That  a
theory of constitutional  fidelity must have an account of the place  of
this stuff in box [3]; more particularly, it must have an account of how
movement into and out of box [3]  matters.  I have  argued that it mat-
ters to both the  potential, and limits, of interpretive fidelity.  It mat-
ters to the potential, because the richer and more extensive this world
of taken-for-granted  is, the greater the creativity a court relying upon
them can be.  Conversely, it also marks the limits, for the more that is
drawn into contest, the more that is in doubt, the less a court can rely
upon it setting either the scope, or limit, of a constitutional value.  The
uncontested sets the potential for what a court can say beyond institu-
tional  defaults;  the  contested  forces  the  court  back  to  institutional
defaults.
This potential and limit, however, are on both sides of the  transla-
tion  practice.  An uncontested  discourse  makes it possible  more  ac-
tively to extend a constitutional  discourse that requires translation;  on
the other hand, an uncontested  discourse makes it easier to limit the
extent of a constitutional right, by pointing to a taken for granted jus-
tification for its limitation.  The same is true of a contested  discourse,
but the other way  round:  A contest will  limit the  ability  of govern-
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ment to restrict the scope  of an otherwise  applicable right; but it will
also limit the ability of the court to effect a translation within a  con-
tested domain.
My model, then, of fidelity as translation can be specified  as follows:
That  translation proceeds subject to the constraints  of contested  dis-
courses, and uncontested discourses.  Sometimes these constraints  ex-
plain shifts of deference, where the court backs  away from creatively
translating  limits on federal  or state power.  Sometimes they explain
shifts of activism, where the court rejects justifications for limiting the
scope of a right because  contest has infected  these justifications.
What's left is to run, as it were, the regressions-to run the story of
constitutional law's development through this model, to see how much
the model fairly  can  explain.  As  I  have  argued  elsewhere,  there  is
enough to suggest that such an  account  does capture  critical turns  in
the story-the  New Deal, and the power  of the presidency,  to name
just two.  But I leave to another time just how much it explains,  and
most importantly, whether, if it does  explain, the model it offers can
be justified.
On justification, however, I will say this.  This is not an account that
tracks a moral debate; as I've said, "moral"  questions pepper all four
of the boxes in my matrix, and this is an account that tracks  the very
special effect of those  boxes that contest.  Rather  than morality, this
account tracks what we all know, and what we all know we dispute.  It
allows  judges  to  speak  confidently  when  they speak,  or  rely,  upon
what we all know; it directs judges to be cautious when they must rely
upon what we all know to be in dispute.
Except when the Constitution has charged  them to activity-when,
for example, it has ratified some moral principle in the form of a right.
For here, contested moral ideals do have a place within law; they have
been ratified, and moved from box  [1]  to box [2].  Here they are held
in the foreground  of law's  focus; they are used,  when transformative,
to remake part of society's life.  Here is where law is driven by moral-
ity, and where  its ends are defined  by a moral understanding.
My  argument  here,  however,  suggests  the important  limit  to  this
jurisprudence  of morals.  For even  where the  principle question  is a
question  of morality,  it is answered  subject  to the  constraint  I  have
called the contested.  Its  answer  is conditioned  by judgments  of pru-
dence, as well  as by the limitations of the contested.  Both parts mat-
ter.  And just as  it would be a mistake to focus,  Frankfurter-like,  on
the constraints alone,  missing thereby an affirmative  command  to act
even when ultimate questions are unresolved, so too is it a mistake to
focus,  Dworkin-like  on  morality  alone.  An account  of fidelity  must
tell us about both.
If there is  a justification for  this account  of fidelity  as  translation,
then the justification comes in the humility this account makes central.
The account is not just an account of humility-it has a place for activ-
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ism, in the face of doubt; but this activism it can tie to acts with strong
democratic pedigree.  Where  it hasn't this pedigree, where questions
are contested, it counsels not prudence, but deference.
CONCLUSION
I  have  argued in  this  Article  for  a  certain  conception  of  fidelity.
The conception is a practice that I have called translation.  Translation
captures, I suggest, the essence of the judge's task; it advises a creativ-
ity in  recapturing what was  said, it cautions  a  certain humility to as-
sure that a translation  says only what was said.  It tracks well much  of
the  shifts that constitutional  law has seen; it understands them  as  ef-
forts, however imperfect, at recapturing and preserving values from a
different place, and time.
I have also argued, however, that translation leaves something out.
If one looks for large changes  in  context  that track large  changes  in
constitutional  law,  often  the  context  seems  too  quiet.  Wild  shifts
within constitutional law seem to occur while nothing outside it seems
to guide it.  Translation seems to miss something, if it promises to ex-
plain the shifts.
My  aim  in the  majority  of  this paper  has  been  to point  to what
translation  simpliciter leaves  out.  Structurally,  what is missing,  is an
account  of  the  institutional  costs  translation  might  occur;  substan-
tively, what is missing is an understanding of the source of this institu-
tional cost.
The source is a constraint  on the practice  of fidelity  as translation,
which  arises  from a kind of change  in  context  too  easily missed,  or
ignored.  This  is  the  change  in  what I have  called  relatively uncon-
tested discourses.  My argument has been that we need to understand
how contestation constrains the ability of a court properly to translate
founding  commitments.  A contested  discourse  removes  a rhetorical
resource  from the  Court;  the  Court  deploys  its  rhetoric  subject  to
these constraints  of the contested.
The class of cases where this question gets raised I have called Erie-
effect cases.  But these divide into two very different kinds.  In some-
where  the  question  is  one  of  institutional  allocation-contestation
weakens  the institutional position  of one  actor  vis-a-vis  another.  It
induces  a  kind  of deference  in  that  actor,  to the  institutional  judg-
ments  of  another.  The  consequences  of contestation  in  these  cases
then  is  retreat;  a  certain passivity, which  disables  the actor  at issue
from  continuing  a  practice  which  before  it  had  engaged  without
trouble.
The other Erie-effect case is quite different.  Here-where the ques-
tion involves an individual right-contestation  weakens the justifica-
tion for invading that right.  Weakening  this justification  strengthens
the claim of the right.  And as the claim of this right is increased, the
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judicial  support for it,  as  against  the  government, increases  as  well.
Here  contestation yields  a kind of activism,  as the court sustains  the
force of this right (whether individual or state) in the face of changing
understandings  of what is, or is not, good reason to limit it.